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Recognizing their role in sustainability efforts, many local governments
are enacting climate change plans, mandatory green building ordinances, and
sustainable procurement policies.  Thus far, however, local governments have
largely ignored one of the most pervasive threats to sustainability—lawns.
This Article examines the trend toward sustainability mandates by considering
the implications of a ban on lawns, the single largest irrigated crop in the
United States.
Green yards are deeply seated in the American ethos of the sanctity of the
single-family home.  This psychological attachment to lawns, however, results
in significant environmental harms: conventional turfgrass is a non-native
monocrop that contributes to a loss of biodiversity and typically requires vast
amounts of water, pesticides, and gas-powered mowing.
In this Article, I consider municipal authority to ban or substantially limit
preexisting lawns and mandate their replacement with native plantings or pro-
ductive fruit- or vegetable-bearing plants.  Although this proposal would no
doubt prove politically contentious, local governments—especially those in
drought-prone areas—might be forced to consider such a mandate in the fu-
ture.  Furthering this practical reality, I address the legitimate zoning, police
power, and nuisance rationales for the passage of lawn bans, as well as the
likely challenges they would face.  I also consider more nuanced regulatory
approaches that a municipality could use to limit lawns and their attendant
environmental harms, including norm change, market-based mechanisms
such as progressive block pricing for water, and incentivizing the removal of
lawns.
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INTRODUCTION
“Mowing the lawn . . . is a civic responsibility.”1
“[T]he sign of a good citizen is a dead lawn.”2
Much of the United States is in the midst of the worst drought in
fifty years.3  At the same time, lawns, which front many suburban
American homes,4 are the largest irrigated crop in the country.5
1 Michael Pollan, Why Mow?: The Case Against Lawns, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 28, 1989,
at 22, 23.
2 Robert Smaus, There Oughta Be a Lawn, L.A. TIMES MAG., July 22, 1990, at 20, 22
(statement of Beth Rogers, quoting an unnamed federal water officer in Northern California).
3 See Editorial, Drought and the Farm Bills, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2012, at A24.
4 See Pollan, supra note 1, at 24; see also FRED E.H. SCHROEDER, FRONT YARD
AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION AND MEANINGS OF A VERNACULAR DOMESTIC LANDSCAPE 1
(1993).
5 See infra notes 6–8, 49 and accompanying text.
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Lawns occupy approximately three times more space than corn6 and
twice as much as cotton,7 and consume up to sixty percent of potable
municipal water supplies in Western cities and up to thirty percent in
Eastern cities.8  As cities and towns confront water shortages and
other concerns associated with climate change, many are beginning to
adopt sustainability plans and ordinances that impose environmentally
beneficial measures upon citizens and corporations—for example,
mandatory green building ordinances, recycling requirements, plastic
bag bans, and limits on what can be burned.9  As climate change adap-
tation measures become more common, it is likely that more munici-
palities will pass ordinances that aim to control individual actions that
have a cumulatively significant impact on the environment.10  At the
same time, existing regulation across much of the United States ac-
tively encourages and arguably requires the maintenance of lawns.11
In this Article, I consider how municipalities can use the law to
reduce lawns and the harms they cause.  Specifically, I examine the
case for municipal lawn bans or similar measures that would curtail
the prominence, or incentivize the demise, of lawns.  Because lawns
are so prevalent and use such a large percentage of potable municipal
water,12 yet offer limited benefits, they are a logical point of attack for
future sustainability ordinances.  This is not far-fetched: a small num-
ber of southwestern localities have begun to prohibit or limit new turf
installation;13 others have incentivized the removal of existing lawns;14
6 See Rebecca Lindsey, Looking for Lawns, NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY (NOV. 8,
2005), http://earthobservatory.nasagov/Features/Lawn/.
7 TED STEINBERG, AMERICAN GREEN: THE OBSESSIVE QUEST FOR THE PERFECT LAWN 4
(2006) (“[T]he lawn is one of America’s leading ‘crops,’ amounting to at least twice the acreage
planted in cotton.  It is estimated that there are roughly twenty-five to forty million acres of turf
in the United States.”  This estimate includes lawns, athletic fields, and golf courses.).
8 Bret Rappaport, As Natural Landscaping Takes Root We Must Weed out the Bad
Laws—How Natural Landscaping and Leopold’s Land Ethic Collide with Unenlightened Weed
Laws and What Must Be Done About It, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 865, 898 n.114 (1993) (assert-
ing that “[t]ypical suburban lawns are water wasters”).
9 See Katrina Fischer Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual Behaviors
that Harm the Environment, 61 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1127–28, 1132–33, 1148 (2012).
10 See id. at 1112 (terming these actions “environmentally significant individual
behaviors”).
11 See James Charles Smith, The Law of Yards, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 203, 216–218 (2006).
12 Rappaport, supra note 8, at 898 n.114; see also Smaus, supra note 2, at 22.
13 See, e.g., SCOTTSDALE, ARIZ., REV. CODE § 49-247 (Supp. 64, 2013) (limiting new model
home landscaping by prohibiting new turf installation in front yards and limiting new turf instal-
lation to ten percent of lots less than 9000 square feet and to five percent of the remainder of
larger lots up to one acre); TUCSON, ARIZ., LAND USE CODE ch. 23, § 3.7.2.2 (1995) (limiting
new turf installation by multifamily residential developments to five percent of the site, 100
square feet, or eight percent of the required open space, whichever is greater); LAS VEGAS,
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and watering and fertilizer limitations are fairly widespread.15  To
date, however, there has been little scholarly discussion of limits on
lawns.16
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of the lawn and dis-
cusses the reasons for its predominance in the United States.  Lawns
are prevalent, in part, because existing laws encourage their growth,17
but also because many Americans share a deep-seated psychological
attachment to them.18  This commitment is rooted in several benefits
of lawns, including: a unifying aesthetic;19 their contribution to social
capital as a place for children to play and for neighbors to gather;20
their impact on property values due to settled expectations and the
NEV., CODE § 14.11.150 (Supp. 2, 2009) (prohibiting new turf installation in residential front
yards and limiting new turf installation in rear and side yards to the greater of fifty percent of
gross area or 100 square feet).
14 See, e.g., SCOTTSDALE, ARIZ., REV. CODE § 49-243 (providing single-family residential
customers up to $1500 in rebates and commercial and multifamily customers up to $3000 in
rebates for removing existing turf and replanting with low-water-use landscaping); Rebate Pro-
grams, CHANDLER, ARIZ., http://www.chandlerazgov/default.aspx?pageid=746 (last visited Feb.
15, 2014) (rebating residents for removing at least 1000 square feet of turf and replacing it with
at least fifty percent non-grass plants); Water Conservation—Landscape Rebates—Existing
Home Conversions, GLENDALE, ARIZ., http://www.glendaleaz.com/waterconservation/land-
scaperebates.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2014) (rebating owners of existing homes $150 to $750 for
removing 500 or more square feet of grass and converting to low-water-use landscape).
15 See, e.g., DOTHAN, ALA., CODE § 102-165 (Supp. 35, 2013) (restricting the watering of
lawns and gardens by Dothan Utilities customers to three days per week from April 1 to Octo-
ber 1 each year); TUCSON, ARIZ., CODE § 27-95 (Supp. 86, 2009) (prohibiting all outdoor irriga-
tion during a “water emergency,” except with reclaimed water); GARDEN GROVE, CAL., MUN.
CODE § 14.40.025 (2012) (prohibiting the watering of lawns between 10 AM and 6 PM and limit-
ing watering that is not continuously attended to no more than fifteen minutes per day per
station); CITY OF GLENDALE DROUGHT MANAGEMENT PLAN 16–19 (2004), available at http://
www.glendaleaz.com/waterconservation/documents/DMP_200604pdf (allowing turf watering
during a “Stage 1 Drought Watch” only between the hours of 9 PM and 6 AM; allowing watering
by city facilities during a “Stage 2 Drought Alert” on every other day based on odd/even ad-
dresses; imposing a drought surcharge on water use above a base level and applying the odd/
even restriction to residential, commercial, and industrial water users during a “Stage 3
Drought”; and prohibiting turf watering altogether during a “Stage 4 Drought Emergency”).
16 The existing scholarship focuses primarily on the need for norm change and the allow-
ance of native plants, largely ignoring the idea of a lawn ban. See generally Asmara M. Tekle,
Lawns and the New Watershed Law, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 213 (2011) (arguing that changes in
norms surrounding lawn ownership are necessary to protect waterways, and generally dismissing
the role of lawn bans); Rappaport, supra note 8, at 867–68 (discussing the need to overturn laws
that prohibit natural landscaping).
17 See infra notes 53–60 and accompanying text.
18 See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
19 See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
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status quo;21 and their role in the norms and ethos of suburban
living.22
Part I next recognizes that, although lawns offer some benefits,
they appear to be outweighed by the substantial number of harms that
lawns create.  These harms include: extreme water use in a time of
water shortages;23 emissions tied to gas-powered lawn mowers and
leaf blowers;24 pollution and runoff from petrochemical-based fertiliz-
ers;25 fire hazards in dry climates;26 and propagation of monocultures
and the loss of biodiversity.27  This Part situates lawn ownership and
its harms within the literature addressing “environmentally significant
individual behaviors.”28  When examined cumulatively, such individ-
ual behaviors may warrant prohibition.  Finally, Part I presents alter-
natives to lawns, including xeriscaping,29 native plantings, productive
plants such as vegetables and fruits, and environmentally sound syn-
thetic lawns.
Part II outlines high-level regulatory techniques that might be ap-
plied to target and correct the harms associated with lawns, including
norm change, market-based mechanisms and incentives, architecture,
and law.  After detailing the difficulties of regulating through norms,
markets, and architecture, this Part argues that some local govern-
ments might consider legal mandates as a potentially powerful regula-
tory option, especially in the face of increasingly extreme climate
conditions.  Although a large-scale movement to ban lawns may cur-
rently be politically implausible in many parts of the country,30 such
21 See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 81, 95 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 108–10 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 113, 116–19 and accompanying text.
26 See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 124–31 and accompanying text.
28 Kuh, supra note 9, at 112.  The scale at which a locality considers cumulative lawn harms
could be tied to the local watershed or the region.
29 Xeriscaping involves low-water-using plants, rocks, or more generally a landscape na-
tive to the surrounding area. See Rappaport, supra note 8, at 898.
30 Many city council members would not vote in favor of an ordinance that infringes on
personal freedoms or goes against the preferences of a majority of homeowners (which a lawn
ban might do). See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLICIES 5–7
(2001) [hereinafter FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS] (arguing that land use decisions
tend to accommodate the interests of homeowners).  Further, even if such a ban were adopted, it
is likely that it would be unpopular and thus repealed (and that those who passed it would be
voted out of office). See Kuh, supra note 9, at 1120 n.21.  Mandates on individual behaviors or
private property are often opposed based on the view that they are too intrusive, or that they
infringe too greatly on private property rights. See Hope M. Babcock, Global Climate Change: A
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bans might be desirable or even necessary in the future as the effects
of climate change—including water shortages—become more
prevalent.31
Because prospective lawn bans are a very recent development
and no local government has yet passed a retroactive ban,32 the cur-
rent literature does not discuss bans in depth.  Therefore, Part III con-
siders the contours of a potential mandate against lawns.  It begins
with a discussion of the sources of municipal authority to regulate
lawns: the police power, regulating in furtherance of the public health,
safety, and welfare of the community;33 the zoning power, pursuant to
enabling legislation;34 and the ability to regulate nuisances.35  It also
addresses the probable defeat of any takings challenge to a lawn ban.
It then turns to the structure of a potential ban on lawns, discuss-
ing when to impose the ordinance and whether the ordinance should
outlaw all turfgrass or just front yards.  A municipality could impose a
lawn ban on three different time periods, making it applicable: (1) to
all new construction; (2) upon the sale, rental, or substantial modifica-
tion of a given property; or (3) retroactively, after a set amortization
period.  The case for applying such a ban to new construction is fairly
straightforward and would face few legal challenges.  A retroactive
ban, however, would likely be viewed more skeptically, even after an
amortization period.36  Moreover, if lawns are considered an existing
use they might be afforded substantial protection from changes in
Civic Republican Moment for Achieving Broader Changes in Environmental Behavior, 26 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2009) [hereinafter Babcock, Global Climate Change] (arguing that man-
dates are likely to “trigger enormous political resistance because of the[ir] interference with
individual liberty and invasion of privacy”).
31 See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
32 By a retroactive ban, I mean one that would require people to tear up their existing
lawns.
33 Some states delegate general powers relating to the administration of local affairs, in-
cluding the police powers, to their municipal corporations through a home rule act or provision
in their constitution. See 1 E.C. YOKLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 57 (1956); see also Rich-
ard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 10–11 (1990).
34 See Catherine J. LaCroix, SEPAs, Climate Change, and Corporate Responsibility: The
Contribution of Local Government, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1289, 1295 (2008) (“[L]ocal gov-
ernments have land use regulatory power and power to adopt local environmental regulations,
both through state legislation authorizing zoning, comprehensive planning, or other regulation,
and through home rule power.”).
35 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 731 (7th ed. 2010) (“The guiding principle [of
nuisance law] is an ancient maxim: Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, meaning that one should
use one’s own property in such a way as not to injure the property of another.”).
36 See infra note 330 and accompanying text.
400 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:394
zoning laws pursuant to vested rights or theories of estoppel.37  Fi-
nally, Part III briefly addresses the ability of a municipality to affirma-
tively require not only the removal of lawns but also their replacement
with alternatives that the locality deems more environmentally
friendly or suitable.
The Article concludes by recognizing that many people would
dislike the idea of “banning lawns.”  At least upon first impression,
they may think it sounds like an unlikely, untenable, and possibly im-
permissible use of the police power.  This Article demonstrates, how-
ever, that it is in fact well within a municipality’s police power to
reduce or eliminate lawns, even by retroactively banning them.  More-
over, these regulatory techniques are likely to become more common
as climate conditions worsen and water becomes increasingly scarce.
Thus, what might at first seem like an implausible proposal may turn
out to be more likely than most would suspect.
I. LAWNS
A. History
Most suburban neighborhoods in the United States have a few
common aesthetic qualities.  One of these qualities is that most homes
are fronted by an expanse of green, non-native turfgrass.38  Although
it is now hard to imagine neighborhoods without lawns, prior to the
Civil War turf cultivation was an uncommon use of property.39
Rather, it was common to see houses fronted with productive vegeta-
ble gardens or native vegetation mixed with dirt.40
Some commentators suggest that the creation and maintenance
of lawns stems from the human desire to dominate and impose order
over nature.41  The same could be said of landscape architecture gen-
37 See infra note 332 and accompanying text.
38 See Lindsey, supra note 6; see also Blades of Glory: America’s Love Affair with Lawns,
WEEK (June 24, 2011), http://theweek.com/article/index/216592/blades-of-glory-americas-love-af-
fair-with-lawns (estimating that eighty percent of homes in the United States have lawns).
39 STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 11 (“Before [the Civil War], most people in towns and cities
either maintained small fenced-in vegetable gardens or simply left the area alone, allowing it to
revert to dirt interspersed with whatever vegetation flourished.”); see also SCHROEDER, supra
note 4, at 5 (noting that before the Civil War, the grass-covered generic front yard did not exist;
it became common only after 1900).
40 STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 11.
41 Pollan, supra note 1, at 41 (discussing the difference between lawns and forests, and
noting that “the urge to dominate nature is a deeply human one, and lawn mowing answers to
it”).  Andrew Jackson Downing, author of the first landscape-gardening book aimed at an Amer-
ican audience, believed that an expanse of “grass mown into a softness like velvet” was an essen-
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erally.42  “If any individual can be said to have invented the American
lawn, it is Frederick Law Olmsted,” the famous landscape architect
who designed Central Park in New York City, along with other well-
known public and private outdoor spaces.43  The aesthetic has its roots
in the English manor, where the lord of the estate maintained a neat,
green expanse by employing a “band[ ] of scythe-wielding servants” or
a shepherd and his flock.44  This suggests that the lawn has a built-in
class significance as well.  In classic English literature, the lawn seems
representative of order—a place where man has established his con-
trol over nature—while the wilderness outside the manor is un-
tamed45—a place where improprietous things may happen.46  The
American lawn is a “democratized” form of the aristocratic manor
lawn, which was more of a “setting for lawn games and . . . a backdrop
for flowerbeds and trees” than an aesthetic masterpiece in and of
itself.47
In recent years, U.S. lawns have expanded at a rapid rate,48 such
that the lawn is now “the single largest irrigated crop in America in
terms of surface area, covering about 128,000 square kilometers in
all.”49  Many theories have been advanced to explain why lawns oc-
cupy the dominant position that they do.50  People have long appreci-
tial component of any perfect garden.  Elizabeth Kolbert, Turf War, NEW YORKER, July 21, 2008,
at 82 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42 See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1556 (1993) (“In a civilized
society, human beings create the reality around them.  Our direct surroundings are buildings and
landscape architecture . . . .”).
43 Pollan, supra note 1, at 41; see also Frederick Law Olmstead, CENTRALPARK.COM, http://
www.centralpark.com/guide/history/frederick-law-olmstedhtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
44 Kolbert, supra note 41, at 82.
45 See, e.g., JANE AUSTEN, MANSFIELD PARK 93–94, 97 (Ernest Rhys ed., J.M. Dent & Co.
1906) (1816) (describing the grounds beyond the manicured lawn as a “wilderness”).
46 See id. at 102 (a scene in which young Miss Bertram becomes impatient waiting for her
fiance´ and squeezes in between a locked gate and a sharp hedge to go for a solitary stroll with
Mr. Crawford, a man whose advances she is entertaining).
47 See Pollan, supra note 1, at 41.
48 See Steinberg, supra note 7, at 4 (“[B]etween 1982 and 1997 . . . the lawn colonized over
382,850 acres of land per year.”).
49 Lindsey, supra note 6.
50 For example, one commentator puts forth four possible reasons:
Lawns exist today for several reasons.  First, lawns serve as a physical and psycho-
logical “moat” between the homeowner and the outside world.  Second, it is theo-
rized that humans are genetically predisposed to favor open grass-type landscapes
as an artifact of our species’ development on the savannas and grasslands of East
Africa.  Third, to many sprawling green shaved lawns are a status symbol delineat-
ing suburban homeowners from their city brethren who generally have neither the
land nor resources to make such a public statement of wealth.  Finally, in the land
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ated the lawn as an essential, beautiful component of the home,51 and
lawn dominance has likely continued due to status quo bias and pref-
erence.52  The lawn norm is deeply embedded.
Existing public and private laws also encourage and often effec-
tively require a neat, short, turfgrass yard.53  From a public law per-
spective, after the Supreme Court declared zoning to be a valid
exercise of the police power,54 suburban development flourished.55
Many of the first suburban municipal zoning ordinances included set-
back regulations, which required buildings to be constructed a certain
distance from the street or sidewalk and thus created an area of space
between the building and the street.56  For commercial structures, this
setback space is often filled in by parking lots; in residential neighbor-
hoods, it is filled in with lawns.  Many localities also have “weed ordi-
nances” that effectively require lawns, both by mandating that ground
cover be kept short, and by prohibiting certain native plantings or veg-
etable gardens in front yards.57  From a private, contractual perspec-
of cookie-cutter tract housing a premium is placed on neatness and conformity both
of which are promoted by mono-turf yards.  Manicured lawns are, unfortunately,
the collective face of modern suburbia.
Rappaport, supra note 8, at 884 (footnotes omitted).
51 STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 12  (noting that the lawn was viewed as “‘the most essential
element of beauty on the grounds of a suburban house’” (quoting FRANK JESUP SCOTT, THE
ART OF BEAUTIFYING SUBURBAN HOME GROUNDS OF SMALL EXTENT 107 (New York, D. Ap-
pleton & Co. 1870))).
52 See generally Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1295,
1321–22 (2009) (discussing status quo bias generally).
53 See infra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.  These restrictive covenants and ordi-
nances are typically justified by concerns about aesthetics and property values or the health and
safety of the community.
54 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387–88, 397 (1926).
55 See Henry R. Richmond, Sprawl and Its Enemies: Why the Enemies Are Losing, 34
CONN. L. REV. 539, 548 (2002).
56 See Smith, supra note 11, at 206 (“[A] person who erected . . . a house had to have land
in a proper use district, observe height and size limits, and comply with set-back requirements
which often mandated the size and existence of yards.”).  One reason for these setbacks was to
avoid potential takings challenges if the government needed to widen roads. FRANK BACKUS
WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF CITY PLANNING AND ZONING 177–79 (1922).
57 See Tekle, supra note 16, at 230 n.72 (giving examples of weed height ordinances, includ-
ing: “KALAMAZOO, MICH., CODE § 17-131(B) (2011) (Great Lakes) (a weed control ordinance
which prohibits uncontrolled weed growth over twelve inches in height or over seed bearing
height); ANNAPOLIS, MD., CODE § 10.20.010 (2011) (Chesapeake Bay) (the height limit of grass,
weeds and ‘other rank vegetation’ is twelve inches); BREMERTON, WASH., CODE § 6.08.020(b)(1)
(2011) (Puget Sound) (prohibiting owners and occupants of properties from allowing grass or
weeds to exceed twelve inches in height); TACOMA, WASH., MUN. CODE § 8.30.040(C)(2) (2010)
(Puget Sound) (considering a nuisance any hazardous vegetation (i.e., vegetation which “poses a
threat to public health, safety and welfare, including vegetation which may harbor rodents or
transient activity”) that is “over one foot in height or length”).
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tive, one fifth of Americans live in residential common-interest
communities that are governed by covenants, conditions, and restric-
tions (“CC&Rs”).58  CC&Rs regularly require setbacks, limit fences,
and may even require front lawns.59  Some CC&Rs also prohibit the
cultivation of vegetables, fruits, or native plants.60  Thus, both existing
laws and agreed-to property rules tend to reinforce the lawn as a sta-
ple of American landscape design.
B. Benefits
Whether the prevalence of lawns is a product of their entrenched
legal status, or whether existing law simply reflects long-held practice,
many feel an attachment to their lawns and believe that lawns offer
benefits to them and their communities.61  Lawns provide a consistent,
unifying aesthetic when one looks down a street.62  Because they are
what people expect, lawns tend to “keep[ ] the neighbors happy and
add[ ] to their property value.”63  By maintaining a neat front yard,
homeowners suggest that they have a relationship to, and shared val-
ues with, their neighbors.64  Thus, not mowing, tending, or maintaining
a lawn could be viewed as a dereliction of one’s civic responsibility
and duty as a member of the community.65
58 See Justin Jouvenal, The Spat That Laid Low Olde Belhaven, WASH. POST, Feb. 10,
2013, at A1 (noting that the number of association-governed communities in the United States
grew from 10,000 in 1970 to 324,000 in 2012, and that one in five Americans now live in an
association-governed community); see also Industry Data, COMMUNITY ASS’NS INST., http://www
.caionline.org/info/research/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2014) (as of 2012, 63.4 mil-
lion people lived in association-governed communities).  Further, the percentage of the total
residential land base taken up by these communities is likely greater than the percentage of the
population living in such communities.
59 SCHROEDER, supra note 4, at 22 (discussing restrictions in deeds).
60 See Sarah B. Schindler, Of Backyard Chickens and Front Yard Gardens: The Conflict
Between Local Governments and Locavores, 87 TUL. L. REV. 231, 289 (2012). [hereinafter Schin-
dler, Of Backyard Chickens] (discussing private covenants).
61 See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
62 F. HERBERT BORMANN, DIANA BALMORI & GORDON T. GEBALLE, REDESIGNING THE
AMERICAN LAWN: A SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARMONY 9 (2nd ed. 2001) (“[L]awns run
together without interruption, giving a neighborhood a sense of unity and providing a source of
community pride.”); Pollan, supra note 1, at 24 (“[T]he lawn has served to unify the American
landscape; it is what makes the suburbs of Cleveland and Tucson . . . look more alike than not.”).
63 STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 7.
64 See, e.g., Pollan, supra note 1, at 23, 41 (describing how the “lawn immediately estab-
lishes a certain relationship with one’s neighbors and, by extension, the larger American land-
scape” and how lawns allow us to “declare our like-mindedness to our neighbors”).
65 Id. at 23 (“Mowing the lawn, I realized the first time I gazed into my neighbor’s yard
and imagined him gazing back into mine, is a civic responsibility.”).  Pollan wrote this article in
1989.  Perhaps norms have since changed sufficiently for one to question the responsibility of
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There are also some health and safety justifications for lawns:
grass can help prevent soil erosion and runoff;66 trap dust and particu-
late matter;67 and can lower temperatures68 and reduce glare and
noise.69  A lawn also provides a better carbon sink70 than a parking
lot.71  Further, many people derive a psychological benefit from hav-
ing a buffer between their homes and the outside world, and the law
protects that buffer.72
maintaining a lawn in the face of the harms that lawns visit upon communities. See infra Part I.C
(discussing harms associated with lawns).
66 STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 7; see also Tekle, supra note 16, at 226 (describing health-
related benefits of lawns, including “absorbing glare, allergens, and noise, [and] guarding against
fire”).
67 See Other Turfgrass Benefits to the Environment, UNIV. OF MINN. SUSTAINABLE UR-
BAN LANDSCAPE INFO. SERIES, http://www.sustland.umn.edu/maint/benefits_4html (last visited
Feb. 15, 2014).
68 V.A. Gibeault et al., California Turfgrass: It’s Use, Water Requirement and Irrigation, 39
CAL. TURFGRASS CULTURE, nos. 3 & 4, 1989, at 1.
69 Id. (“[T]urfgrasses directly influence our immediate environment in many positive ways.
As examples, actively growing turfgrasses have been shown to reduce high summer ground sur-
face temperatures because of transpirational cooling. . . ., reduce discomforting glare and traffic
noise. . . .[, and] increase infiltration of water into the soil profile and also increase[ ] the water
quality . . . .”).
70 See Cristina Milesi et al., Mapping and Modeling the Biogeochemical Cycling of Turf
Grasses in the United States, 36 ENVTL. MGMT. 426, 426 (2005) (demonstrating that “well-
watered and fertilized turf grasses act as a carbon sink,” meaning that they are able to absorb
and store carbon dioxide); Yaling Qian & Ronald F. Follett, Assessing Soil Carbon Sequestration
in Turfgrass Systems Using Long-Term Soil Testing Data, 94 AGRONOMY J. 930, 935 (2002); see
also BES Long Term Stream and Watershed Study Update—Overview, BALT. ECOSYSTEM
STUDY, http://www.beslter.org/frame4-page_3f_05html (last visited Feb. 15, 2014) (suggesting
that pervious lawns might be net nitrogen sinks, as opposed to nitrogen sources).
71 Mark Bittman, Lawns Into Gardens, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Jan. 29, 2013, 9:00 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/lawns-into-gardens/ (noting that while a lawn is
a better carbon sink than concrete, meadows and vegetable gardens provide better sinks than
lawns).
72 See Nancy M. Wells & Gary W. Evans, Nearby Nature: A Buffer of Life Stress Among
Rural Children, 35 ENV’T & BEHAV. 311, 321 (2003) (ranking an outdoor grass yard high on the
“naturalness scale” and determining that “the presence of nearby nature moderates or buffers
the impact of life stress on children”).  A court may also use the “curtilage doctrine” to elevate
the lawn’s protection under the Fourth Amendment.  Curtilage is the area surrounding the home
“to which extends the intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the
privacies of life.’”  Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).  Courts tend to protect “families and personal privacy in [the
curtilage,] an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where
privacy expectations are most heightened.”  California v. Ciarolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986); see
also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that if the physical
curtilage is protected, “it is surely as a result of solicitude to protect the privacies of the life
within”).
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Some also see lawns as providing a community-centered bene-
fit73—a space where neighbors can gather.74  They are also more user-
friendly than, for example, a rocky desert landscape; they provide a
soft place for children and dogs to play.75  Lawns can enhance social
capital in a given neighborhood by providing an area that facilitates
such interactive behavior.76  This ties into the idea of the lawn as
deeply seated in the ethos of the sanctity of the single-family home
and of home ownership itself.77  Justice Douglas, in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas,78 famously exclaimed, “[a] quiet place where yards
are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate
guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs.”79  The po-
lice power is broad enough to accomplish these goals: it can be used to
mandate wide yards under the guise of furthering the public welfare.
C. Harms
Although many individuals have a strong psychological attach-
ment to their lawns, that attachment comes with a significant cost.  In
73 See, e.g., BORMANN ET AL., supra note 62, at 23 (citing Bruce Kelly, Art of the Olmsted
Landscape, in ART OF THE OLMSTED LANDSCAPE 5 (Bruce Kelly et al. eds., 1981)) (discussing
the lawn as a unifier and provider of a sense of community).
74 Id. at 3 (“A lawn is a gathering place for family, friends, and neighbors, a place where
we engage in our favorite activities.  In cities, it is a place of verdure, a refuge from crowds,
traffic, and noise.”).
75 Richard Benke, Dew Point, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 1998, § 16 (“‘Most folks want a place for
their kids to play . . .’ said Bobby Lee of Conroy’s Landscaping.  ‘They see a need for grass.’”).
But if lawns were banned, a locality could compensate for the loss of play space by installing
more public parks in urban and suburban areas.  Public parks provide space for the development
of social ties.  Aleksandra Kazmierczak, The Contribution of Local Parks to Neighbourhood
Social Ties, 109 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 31, 40 (2013).
76 See DOUGLAS FARR, SUSTAINABLE URBANISM: URBAN DESIGN WITH NATURE 147
tbl.7-10 (2008) (listing lawns as a criteria for suburban, outdoor “third place[s]” for students,
nonworking adults, working parents and working professionals). But see ROBERT D. PUTNAM,
BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 211 (2000)
(discussing the decline in social capital caused by suburbanization, and observing that “‘[w]ith
increased use of automobiles, the life of the sidewalk and the front yard has largely disappeared,
and the social intercourse that used to be the main characteristic of urban life has vanished’”
(quoting KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 272, 279–80 (1985))).  For this reason, there might be environmental justice
concerns associated with a ban on lawns.  Open space, and especially green space, is lacking in
many poor urban areas; requiring removal of lawns might be taking away some of the limited
green space that exists in a community. See generally Pengyu Zhu & Yaoqi Zhang, Demand for
Urban Forests in United States Cities, 84 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 293 (2008).
77 See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974). But see generally Stephanie M.
Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093
(2009) (disputing standard accounts of the importance accorded to the home).
78 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
79 Id. at 9.
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many localities, lawns may be inefficient80 and may cause harms that
outweigh their benefits.  Those harms include dramatic potable water
consumption,81 high energy costs from water use,82 increased water
and air pollution,83 and loss of biodiversity.84  Because lawns cover
such a large percentage of our built environment,85 we must account
for these harms cumulatively.
When considering large-scale environmental harms, one often
imagines commercial manufacturing facilities with polluting smoke-
stacks.  A growing area of legal scholarship, however, focuses on “the
environmental significance of individual behaviors and lifestyles”—ac-
tions that scholars term “environmentally significant individual behav-
iors.”86  Many existing environmental laws—especially comprehensive
federal laws—fail to regulate individual actions that, cumulatively, re-
sult in significant harm to the environment.87  Though the actions
taken by a single individual to keep her lawn neat and green might be
environmentally insignificant, on a nationwide scale, or even one
based on the local watershed, lawn care may have a substantial impact
and thus warrants close consideration.88  Further, while the govern-
80 See Stephen E. Margolis, Two Definitions of Efficiency in Law and Economics, 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 471, 473–74 (1987) (“An efficient legal system is one in which property rights are
assigned and liability rules are formulated so that the value of the things present in society, as
measured by willingness to pay, is maximized over all alternative legal environments, given the
costs of transacting.”).  The efficiency of a lawn is inherently tied to its location.  There are parts
of the United States where lawns, even non-native ones, grow well without substantial watering,
fertilizing, or pesticide application. See, e.g., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF SANITATION, LEAVE IT ON THE
LAWN: A GUIDE TO MULCH-MOWING, available at http://www.nycgov/html/nycwasteless/
downloads/pdf/materials/lawnpdf (describing lawn care best practices in New York City).  If indi-
viduals in these areas mow their lawns with push mowers, many of the harms discussed in this
section would not be applicable.  Thus, the balance between lawn benefits and lawn harms is
regionally dependent.
81 See infra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
82 See supra note 102–07 and accompanying text.
83 See infra notes 108–10 and accompanying text.
84 See infra note 124–31 and accompanying text.
85 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
86 See Kuh, supra note 9, at 1116 n.12, 1117 n.15 (defining these behaviors as “behaviors of
individuals that, taken alone, have a negligible impact on the environment but that, in the aggre-
gate, may significantly harm the environment”); Paul C. Stern, Toward a Coherent Theory of
Environmentally Significant Behavior, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 407, 408 (2000) (defining environmen-
tally significant individual behavior).
87 See Kuh, supra note 9, at 1116.
88 See, e.g., Keith H. Hirokawa, At Home with Nature: Early Reflections on Green Building
Laws and the Transformation of the Built Environment, 39 ENVTL. L. 507, 562 (2009) (“Actions
that may not have previously appeared to be worthy of regulation have been found to cause
significant adverse impacts cumulatively, over time, and in context—heading us toward a certain
death by a thousand cuts.” (footnote omitted)); see also Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal
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ment can control some sources of environmental harm by regulating
manufacturers, there is no upstream source through which to regulate
the harms associated with lawns; thus, the most logical place to impose
regulation is on the individual’s behavior.89
Although regulation of lawns is technically a property restriction,
it is also inherently a limitation on individual actions; if a property
restriction is put in place that retroactively bans all lawns, an individ-
ual may not plant a new lawn, may not continue to water or mow an
existing lawn, and may even be forced to tear up an existing lawn.
Individual actions like these are environmentally significant because
every person is a polluter; our individual actions “lie at the core of
both the climate-change problem and its potential solutions.”90  As
one commentator notes, “[w]e pollute when we drive our cars, fertilize
and mow our yards, pour household chemicals on the ground or down
the drain, and engage in myriad other common activities.”91  Thus, the
law should find a way to capture these individual but cumulatively
significant harms.92  It is important to consider harms in this context,
because it is only by considering the failures of the current system that
we can determine which types of regulatory approaches will best ad-
dress and correct those failures.93
Lawns often require substantial quantities of water to maintain
color, health, and appearance.  For the last hundred years, Americans
have come to see water as “abundant, safe, and cheap,” living in what
one commentator has referred to as “the golden age of water.”94
Those days are waning, however—many parts of the United States are
facing one of the worst water shortages in recent history, and climate
change will alter weather patterns such that these droughts will be-
Responsibility for Improving the Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 120–21 (2009) [hereinafter Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsi-
bility] (discussing individual pollution).
89 For example, there is less need to regulate the individual use of cars because the govern-
ment could require manufacturers to create cars that do not emit greenhouse gas emissions.
90 Kuh, supra note 9, at 1114.  The same could be said of air quality.
91 Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity
in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 518 (2004) [hereinafter
Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV] (emphasis added).
92 Kuh, supra note 9, at 1116 n.12.
93 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE (1990) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, RIGHTS REVOLUTION].
94 CHARLES FISHMAN, THE BIG THIRST: THE SECRET LIFE AND TURBULENT FUTURE OF
WATER 9 (2011) (“The last century has conditioned us to think that water is naturally abundant,
safe, and cheap . . . . We are entering a new era of water scarcity—not just in traditionally dry or
hard-pressed places . . . but in places we think of as water-wealthy . . . .”).
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come more common.95  Thus, climate change adaptation is inherently
linked to water concerns, and therefore to lawns.96
People like green lawns, and in many parts of the country green
lawns mean heavily-watered and fertilized lawns.97  Because most turf-
grass is a non-native species,98 it often needs assistance to thrive; some
people even water their lawn twice per day.99  A large percentage of
the potable municipal water supply is used for this purpose; studies
suggest that approximately sixty percent in the West and thirty per-
cent in the East is being used for lawn irrigation.100  In real numbers,
the EPA estimates that residential landscape irrigation accounts for
approximately nine billion gallons of water per day, and one-third of
all residential water use in the United States.101
95 See id. at 9, 56; Holly Doremus, Climate Change and the Evolution of Property Rights, 1
U. CAL. IRVINE L. REV. 1091, 1104–05, 1115 (2011) [hereinafter Doremus, Evolution] (sug-
gesting that both flooding and droughts will increase as “[c]limate change will . . . alter the total
amount of precipitation.  In general, the northern and eastern portions of the country are ex-
pected to get wetter, while the already arid Southwest gets drier.”); see also Michael E. Webber,
Op-Ed., Will Drought Cause the Next Blackout?, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2012, at A21 (“Climate-
change models . . . suggest that droughts and heat waves may be more frequent and severe.”).
96 Doremus, Evolution, supra note 95, at 1103 (noting that “[t]he problem of adaptation to
climate change is in many ways a water problem”).
97 While a lawn in certain parts of the United States might grow well without a lot of
assistance, “‘out West . . . the only way to grow those grasses is with high use of water and
nitrogen fertilizer.’”  Lindsey, supra note 6 (quoting Cristina Milesi).
98 Id. (“‘[M]ost of the grasses used in U.S. lawns aren’t native to the area they are
grown.’” (quoting Cristina Milesi)).
99 Id. (“‘I had a neighbor who would water every day, even twice a day.’” (quoting Cris-
tina Milesi)).  Compare this to green roofs: “Plant selections are typically hardy, drought-toler-
ant varieties that need little maintenance, no fertilizers or pesticides, and scant human
intervention of any kind once established.” NOAH GARRISON & CARA HOROWITZ, NATURAL
RES. DEF. COUNCIL, REPORT NO. R:12-06-B, LOOKING UP: HOW GREEN ROOFS AND COOL
ROOFS CAN REDUCE ENERGY USE, ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE, AND PROTECT WATER RE-
SOURCES IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 12 (2012).
100 Rappaport, supra note 8, at 898 n.114; see also CONNIE LOCKHART ELLEFSON ET AL.,
XERISCAPE GARDENING: WATER CONSERVATION FOR THE AMERICAN LANDSCAPE 3 (1992)
(suggesting that residential landscapes, including lawns, consume at least fifty percent of the
domestic water used in the United States); Smaus, supra note 2 (“California’s estimated 1.38
million acres of lawn are thought to use the bulk of the water applied to the landscape.  Studies
done by the North Marin County Water District indicate that, at least in that region, lawns soak
up about 90% of all water used outdoors in suburban areas.”); Conserving Water, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epagov/greenhomes/ConserveWaterhtm (last updated Dec.
19, 2012) (stating that up to thirty percent of the total U.S. water supply is used for outdoor uses,
primarily irrigation); Lindsey, supra note 6 (noting that “drinking-quality water” is used to water
most lawns).
101 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REDUCE YOUR OUTDOOR WATER USE (2013), available
at http://www.epagov/WaterSense/docs/factsheet_outdoor_water_use_508pdf.  If every lawn in
the contiguous United States were well-watered, the amount of water used for domestic and
commercial lawns would equal 184 to 238 gallons per person per day.  Lindsey, supra note 6
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The amount of water used is even more problematic when one
considers the resultant energy costs.  In the United States, water is
typically collected, treated, and delivered to consumers before it is
used to water lawns, consuming large amounts of energy at each step
in the process.102  Much of the water used for lawn care has to be
transported from elsewhere, which contributes to emissions and thus
global climate change.103  Specifically, most municipal water is either
surface water that must be extracted from rivers or streams, or
groundwater that must be pumped from aquifers.104  The utilities that
then treat and distribute the water must use energy to do so, and be-
cause many of the pipe distribution systems in the United States are
old, a substantial amount of this already-treated potable water is lost
during transport.105  As for the water that does reach end users, it is
often further heated or cooled, requiring the expenditure of additional
energy.106  The high energy cost of water is also connected to the water
subsidies that are prevalent in the United States; although people re-
quire drinking water for survival and certain agricultural pursuits war-
rant subsidized water costs, there is no valid reason for allowing
individuals to avoid paying the true cost of water, including its energy
costs, when it is merely used for growing grass.107
(citing Cristina Milesi).  This works out to approximately 84 billion gallons of water per day used
on lawns. See STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 8 (noting that a Florida golf course consumes approx-
imately 178,800 gallons of water each day and that this amount is “enough to meet the daily
water needs of more than twenty-two hundred Americans”).  A standard lawn in the suburbs
requires approximately 10,000 gallons of water each year, not including rainwater. Conserving
Water, supra note 100.
102 See RONNIE COHEN, BARRY NELSON & GARY WOLFF, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL,
ENERGY DOWN THE DRAIN: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF CALIFORNIA’S WATER SUPPLY 2 (2004),
available at http://www.nrdc.org/water/conservation/edrain/edrainpdf.
103 See Ben Jervey, The Waterless City, GOOD (Apr. 23, 2011, 10:00AM), www.good.is/
post/the-waterless-city (“[T]oday, roughly 85 percent of the water flowing through Los Angeles’
pipes comes from afar.  A mere 15 percent of Los Angeles’ water comes from local groundwater
sources.”).
104 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 102, at 2 (“The State Water Project (SWP) is the largest
single user of energy in California. . . . SWP energy use accounts for 2 to 3 percent of all electric-
ity consumed in California.  The SWP consumes so much energy because of where it sends its
water.  To convey water to Southern California from the Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta, the
SWP must pump it 2,000 feet over the Tehachapi Mountains. . . . Pumping one acre-foot of SWP
water to the region requires approximately 3,000 [kilowatt hours].”); see also Water—Energy
Connection, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epagov/region9/waterinfrastructure/
waterenergyhtml (last updated Dec. 15, 2012).
105 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 102, at 17 (noting that “[l]osses vary significantly among
urban suppliers: typically from 6 to 15 percent, but as high as 30 percent”).
106 See id. at v (determining that more energy is consumed by water’s end user than during
its conveyance or treatment).
107 While a broad discussion of water subsidies is beyond the scope of this Article, see
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Beyond energy production, emissions are associated with lawns in
other ways as well.  Specifically, almost all people with yards mow
them (or hire others to do so), typically with a gas-powered lawn
mower, and many use leaf blowers to rid their lawns of debris.108
Thirty minutes of leaf blower usage creates the same amount of “pol-
luting hydrocarbon emissions as driving a car seventy-seven hundred
miles at a speed of thirty miles per hour.”109  Cumulatively, these indi-
vidual actions substantially increase not only emissions, but smog and
particulate matter.110  Lawns are also expensive and time consuming
to maintain.  Estimates suggest that people in the United States spend
approximately forty billion dollars each year on lawn care,111 and
mowing and tending a lawn may occupy hours every week.112
Another lawn-related harm is tied to the petrochemical-based
fertilizers with which many lawns are treated.113  Although front yards
may look identical in Ohio, Arizona, and Georgia, their local geogra-
phy, weather, and growing conditions are not.114  Homeowners require
“the tools of 20th-century industrial civilization—its chemical fertiliz-
ers, pesticides, herbicides, and machinery” to keep lawns green and
growing in many parts of the United States.115  These chemicals pol-
lute stormwater runoff116 that often flows into local bodies of water.117
The United States is not meeting water quality standards in large part
because of urban runoff.118  Although some point source pollution—
generally James L. Huffman, The Federal Role in Water Resource Management, 17 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 669 (2008); see also infra notes 195–97 and accompanying text.
108 Of course, leaf-blowers might still be used on artificial lawns or xeriscaped yards.
109 STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 8.
110 See id. at 4.
111 Id. at 5.
112 See, e.g., Pollan, supra note 1 (describing spending four hours mowing his lawn each
week).
113 See Rappaport, supra note 8, at 901 n.119 (“[M]any homeowners apply fertilizers, pesti-
cides and herbicides to maintain and beautify their exotic turf landscapes.”).
114 See Pollan, supra note 1 (discussing the “green mantle of grass” that stretches across the
continent, despite differing local conditions).
115 Id. at 42 (“[L]awns . . . receive, on average, more pesticide and herbicide per acre than
just about any crop grown in this country.”); see also Kevin S. Baldwin, Rethinking Lawns, 3
QUARKS DAILY (May 14, 2012), http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2012/05/rethinking-
lawnshtml (“[M]onoculture is a triumph of technology.  It takes a lot of inputs to maintain such a
beast: Regular mowing, herbicides, fungicides, pesticides, fertilizer, and in some areas, water.
Perhaps that is the point.”).
116 Tekle, supra note 16, at 215.
117 See id. at 215–16 (noting that “when introduced into bodies of water, lawn chemicals,
especially phosphorous and nitrogen from lawn fertilizer, create ‘dead zones’ where algae bloom
in excess”).
118 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-679, WATER QUALITY: BETTER DATA
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from defined sources like factories and wastewater treatment plants—
has been substantially reduced through regulations, urban stormwater
runoff is still a major source of environmental harm.119  It is within the
purview of local governments to regulate much of the land use that
results in that form of pollution.120  Further, although runoff is much
more pronounced from truly impervious surfaces, such as pavement,
“compacted soils mono-turf landscapes” like lawns can be “near im-
pervious,” and thus result in much greater amounts of runoff than
would a natural landscape with a greater variety of topography.121
Runoff from lawns also contributes to the prevalence of pesticides in
urban waterways.122  In addition to environmental harm, there is also
some evidence that lawn chemicals and weed killers can increase can-
cer in pets and humans, respectively.123
The non-native nature of turfgrass also results in harms associ-
ated with ecological principles and loss of species biodiversity.124  This
landscape reduces the amount of habitat that might otherwise be
available for native plants, thus “hasten[ing] the process of plant ex-
tinction.”125  For example, the prairie is an extremely endangered
ecosystem that provides an important habitat for birds and butterflies,
and requires little water.126  Additionally, in many dry climates, lawns
AND EVALUATION OF URBAN RUNOFF PROGRAMS NEEDED TO ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS 37
(2001).
119 Nonpoint source pollution consists of pollution from diffuse sources. What Is Nonpoint
Source Pollution?, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://water.epagov/polwaste/nps/
whatis.cfm (last updated Aug. 27, 2012).  If water goes to storm drains, however, it is not consid-
ered nonpoint source runoff. Stormwater Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://
cfpub.epagov/npdes/home.cfm?program_id=6 (last updated Feb. 16, 2012) (noting that
“stormwater discharges are considered point sources”).
120 See John R. Nolon, Historical Overview of the American Land Use System: A Diagnostic
Approach to Evaluating Governmental Land Use Control, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 821, 838
(2006).
121 See Rappaport, supra note 8, at 901 n.119.
122 See generally U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, USGS FACT SHEET NO. 092-00, PESTICIDES IN
STREAM SEDIMENT AND AQUATIC BIOTA, available at http://water.usgsgov/nawqa/pnsp/pubs/
fs09200/fs09200pdf; see also U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR 1225, THE QUALITY OF OUR
NATION’S WATERS: NUTRIENTS AND PESTICIDES 58 (1999), available at http://pubs.usgsgov/circ/
circ1225/pdf/pestpdf (noting the prevalence of pesticides in both groundwater and streams and
finding that ninety percent of stream water sampled contained at least one pesticide).
123 Rappaport, supra note 8, at 923 (“[R]esearchers at the National Cancer Institute have
linked frequent chemical-lawn treatments to an increased incidence of deadly cancer in dogs and
suggest a link between the weed killer, 2, 4-D, and cancer in humans.”).
124 See, e.g., id. at 877 n.30 (“Mono-turf landscapes destroy diversity.  The restoration and
maintenance of the native (natural) characteristics of the bioregion is a key to species
preservation.”).
125 Id. at 885.
126 Hollie O’Connor, Saving the Prairie, and Planting Some New Ones, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
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are a potential fire hazard; fire hazards maybe be reduced if native
plants or xeriscaping is used instead of lawns.127  Furthermore, lawns
also tend to create more allergy-producing pollen than native plant-
ings.128  They also fail to provide the same level of ecosystem ser-
vices129 as native plants130 or even some vegetable gardens.131  All of
these factors combine to lead some to view the lawn as “the most
obvious example of humankind’s disregard for Nature.”132
Although in many ways the current legal structure mandates
lawns, they are often environmentally and financially inefficient, for
the reasons discussed above.  Yet property rules and laws are typically
organized in such a way as to incentivize or encourage the productive
use of property and to avoid waste.133  These rules are informed by
numerous strands of property theory.  For example, Locke’s labor the-
ory of property suggests that people have ownership interests in prop-
19, 2012, at A23 (lamenting the loss of existing prairies to serve as seed banks for others and
noting the hurdles of planting prairies in cities, including the view that they are weeds or could
hide snakes or bodies).
127 See, e.g., NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, FIRE INVESTIGATIONS: OAKLAND/BERKELEY HILLS
FIRE 7 (1991) (describing a dry spell in 1991 that turned the “once-lush grass” of the Oakland
and Berkeley Hills region into a “rich source of dry fuel” that fed a devastating fire).  Fires are a
clear health and safety issue, and fire prevention was one of the early reasons that zoning ordi-
nances were adopted. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 75 (3d
ed. 2005) (describing a Boston ordinance from 1906 that sought to minimize fire hazards).  How-
ever, certain native vegetation is also prone to burning. See Climate, Fire, and Habitat in South-
ern California, U. CAL. COOPERATIVE EXTENSION, http://ucanr.edu/sites/SAFELandscapes/
Fire_in_Southern_California_Ecosystems/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
128 See Green Landscaping: Greenacres, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www
.epagov/greenacres/nativeplants/factshthtml (last updated June 29, 2012) (explaining that most
native flowers do not cause allergies because they are insect pollinated rather than wind pol-
linated, and that many species of turfgrass are responsible for pollen allergens).
129 Generally, ecosystem services are “basic services [of nature] that support life itself . . .
such as purification of air and water, pest control, renewal of soil fertility, climate regulation,
pollination of crops and vegetation, and waste detoxification and decomposition.”  James Salz-
man, A Field of Green?: The Past and Future of Ecosystem Services, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 133, 133 (2006).  These services are not accounted for in traditional markets, and thus are
often undervalued. See id. at 134; see also generally LISA HEINZERLING & FRANK ACKERMAN,
PRICING THE PRICELESS: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (2002).
130 Rappaport, supra note 8, at 899 n.116 (“[N]ative plants curtail non-point source pollu-
tion by trapping run-off, anchoring existing soil and slowing and filtering run-off from melting
snow and summer storms.”).
131 See generally Jac Smit & Joe Nasr, Urban Agriculture for Sustainable Cities: Using
Wastes and Idle Land and Water Bodies as Resources, 4 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 141 (1992)
(discussing the benefits of urban agriculture).
132 Rappaport, supra note 8, at 886.
133 See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1275 (2009) (describing this as the “now familiar—if not standard—ac-
count of property law”).
2014] BANNING LAWNS 413
erty in which they invest their labor.134  Law and economics theorists
have described the way that private property ownership serves to in-
ternalize externalities, thus fostering more efficient use of property.135
Such theories form the basis of property doctrines such as adverse
possession,136 which seek to decrease the inefficient use of land and
increase its efficient use.137  In contrast, the law in many communities
currently requires, and certainly allows, lawns that are inefficient and
that affirmatively cause harm to those communities.  Alternative pro-
ductive uses of property—food-producing gardens or native plants,
for example—would provide ecosystem services benefits and thus
would be more efficient.  Such a result would be more in line with
standard views of the purpose of property law.138
D. Alternatives
Given that lawns create numerous harms, the door is open for
municipal action to devise a new lawn paradigm.  There are a number
of options that would likely produce many of the same benefits as, or
perhaps even more benefits than, lawns and substantially fewer
harms.139 Specifically, lawns could be replaced with: native plantings
134 JOHN LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Govern-
ment, in THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERA-
TION 15 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1948) (1690) (“[E]very man has a property in his own
person . . . . The labour of his body and the work of his hands we may say are properly his.
Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath
mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
property.”).
135 See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J. ECON.
HIST. 16, 22 (1973); see also Richard A. Epstein, How to Create—or Destroy—Wealth in Real
Property, 58 ALA. L. REV. 741, 762 (2007) (suggesting that the Council’s decision to sell the
property at issue in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), is an example
of the internalization that accompanies private ownership).
136 Other theories, including personhood, also justify adverse possession. See Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897) (“A thing which you have
enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in
your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself,
however you came by it.”).
137 See ALVIN ARNOLD, REAL ESTATE INVESTOR’S DESKBOOK § 8:8 (2013).  Similarly, re-
ciprocal negative easements are permissible, in part, because they benefit entire neighborhoods.
See, e.g., Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496, 496–98 (Mich. 1925).
138 See supra notes 133–37 and accompanying text.
139 Of course, some potential lawn substitutes would create equal, or perhaps worse, im-
pacts.  For example, if lawns were replaced with non-native vegetation, impervious pavement or
surfaces, crushed rock, or larger building footprints, the lawn ban might have net negative ef-
fects.  Thus, this Article asserts that it is important for a municipality that is considering a lawn
ban to also mandate the options with which the lawn may be replaced. See infra Part III.C.
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or xeriscaping; productive landscapes, including vegetable gardens or
fruit-bearing trees; or synthetic lawns.140
1. Xeriscaping and Native Planting
Xeriscaping is often thought of as desert or dry landscaping, but
can be used more generally to describe any landscaping that uses na-
tive plants and is thus sustained primarily by natural rainfall.141  Native
plants are those that are adapted to local climates, and thus typically
require less maintenance and watering than non-native turfgrass.142
These are not new ideas,143 yet many people hold biases against xeris-
caping, viewing it as nothing more than bland gravel and cacti: “Look-
ing down a row of lawns interrupted by xeriscape is like looking at
someone ‘who has a tooth missing,’ said [the] chairman of [an] archi-
tectural control committee.”144  Thus, those communities interested in
promoting or requiring native plantings and xeriscaping first have to
work on “myth busting”145—ensuring that people understand the eco-
logical,146 monetary, and water-saving147 benefits of this type of
landscape.
2. Productive Landscapes
Productive landscapes, such as those containing vegetable- and
fruit-producing plants and bushes, do not always require less water
140 See Tekle, supra note 16, at 219–20 (discussing “‘green’ and permeable residential land-
scapes . . . such as xeriscaping or native planting, wildflowers or meadow, ‘working’ or edible
landscapes such as gardens or fruit trees, artificial turf, micro-wetlands, permaculture, the less-is-
more lawn or freedom lawn” (footnotes omitted)).
141 See Christian D. Petrangelo, Note, Altering the Home Landscape from London’s Bor-
oughs to America’s “Sin City”: Are Urban Authorities Using the Right Set of Land Use Law and
Policy Tools in Adapting to Climate Change?, 36 VT. L. REV. 779, 798 (2012) (“[X]eriscaping
emulates the flora of the local environment, leading (in the ideal long-term) to a simple, com-
plete reliance on natural precipitation rather than human watering.”); see also GAYLE WEIN-
STEIN, XERISCAPE HANDBOOK: A HOW-TO GUIDE TO NATURAL, RESOURCE-WISE GARDENING
vii–viii (1999).
142 Green Landscaping: Greenacres, supra note 128 (describing the needs of native plants).
143 A 1993 article discusses “many seminars held on natural landscaping, prairie restora-
tion, xeriscaping, or wildflower propagation, [which were attended by] suburban yuppies, week-
end ecologists, and seniors whose retirement hobby is gardening.”  Rappaport, supra note 8, at
867.
144 Benke, supra note 75.
145 O’Connor, supra note 126.
146 See Rappaport, supra note 8, at 897–98 (noting that some local governments have em-
braced natural landscaping, and stating that “[e]cologically there is no doubt that natural land-
scapes are preferable particularly when compared to traditional suburban exotic lawns”).
147 See Taylor E.C. Hawes, Water Conservation, TRENDS, Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 10, 10.
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than lawns,148 but they provide other environmental, ecological, and
sustainability benefits such that a municipality might decide that, on
balance, they are more appropriate than mono-cultured turf.149  In a
sense, productive landscapes represent a return to past, pre-zoning
practices.150  Currently, however, many localities’ weed ordinances
prohibit individuals from growing vegetables in their front yards.151
That said, there is a recent trend toward relaxing those ordinances and
allowing or encouraging productive front yards for a number of rea-
sons.152  As I discussed in a previous article, allowing individuals full
use of their property to grow their own food has a number of benefits,
including an increase in food safety, and a reduction in food insecu-
rity, food deserts, reliance on processed foods, and food miles trav-
eled—and thus a reduction in harms associated with climate change,
monocropping, and polluted runoff.153  Further, allowing, encourag-
ing, or even requiring productive landscapes in suburban communities
could have the added benefit of partially offsetting the loss of farm-
land that has resulted from suburban sprawl and population growth.154
3. Synthetic Lawns
Synthetic lawns avoid many of the harms that monocropped turf
poses.  They do not need to be watered or mowed, and therefore re-
quire less maintenance and time.155  Estimates suggest that a typical
home would save around 234,000 gallons of water over ten years by
148 Vegetable and Flower Gardens, DENVER WATER, http://www.denverwater.org/Conser-
vation/TipsTools/Outdoor/VegetableGarden/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2014) (“A healthy vegetable
and annual flower garden can use less or about the same amount of water as a lawn does.”).  The
use of drip-irrigation systems can sufficiently water many fruit and vegetable plants while using
relatively little water. Id.
149 See, e.g., Pollan, supra note 1 (“What is the alternative [to lawns]?  To turn them into
gardens.  I’m not suggesting that there is no place for lawns in these gardens or that gardens by
themselves will right our relationship to the land, but the habits of thought they foster can take
us some way in that direction.”); see also Bittman, supra note 71.
150 Pollan states:
19th-century visitors [to the United States] noted . . . the typical yard was ‘land-
scaped’ in the style Southerners would come to call ‘white trash’—a few chickens,
some busted farm equipment, mud and weeds, an unkempt patch of vegetables.
This might do for farmers, but for the growing number of middle-class city peo-
ple . . . something more respectable was called for.
Pollan, supra note 1.  There is now a way to have chickens and gardens that is more “urban-
hipster-chic” than “white trash.”
151 See Schindler, Of Backyard Chickens, supra note 60, at 240.
152 See id. at 235–36.
153 Id. at 262–78.
154 See id. at 248.
155 Pollan, supra note 1 (discussing the four hours per week he spent mowing his lawn).
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installing a synthetic lawn.156  There are environmental costs associ-
ated with producing them, however, especially if the product is pro-
duced from plastic.157  Further, synthetic lawns provide none of the
ecosystem services that native plantings provide, and depending on
the material, could increase runoff.158  Finally, it is debatable whether
they provide the same connection to “nature and the natural” that
even a non-native lawn might.159
4. Weeds
Finally, lawns could be left to revert to their natural state, a prac-
tice that was common in the past and is still customary in many parts
of the world.  For example, in Italy, “[i]f there is grass in the yard, it is
generally a mixture of clover, dandelions, and lots of other so-called
weeds, able to survive the long dry summers with little additional
water.”160  Of course, in many localities, existing weed ordinances
would need to be revised to allow this type of growth to flourish.161
Further, because the idea that an unkempt lawn is a nuisance, prone
to harboring vermin and opening the door to additional blight, pro-
vides the basis for many of those weed ordinances, the norms underly-
ing those ideas would likely also need to change.162
Given these alternatives, the question is: how does a municipality
encourage or force their adoption?  The next Part considers four fun-
damental tools for achieving the policy goal of replacing the tradi-
tional lawn with more sustainable alternatives.
156 Andrew Abramson, West Palm Set to Lift Ban on Artificial Turf for Parks, Fields, PALM
BEACH POST (June 3, 2012, 6:54 PM), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/west-palm-set-
to-lift-ban-on-artificial-turf-for-p/nPMdz/.
157 See Dawn Isaac, Life in Plastic, GUARDIAN WEEKEND, July 17, 2010, at 66.  Of note,
many synthetic lawns are now being made with recycled and environmentally friendly materials.
Nick Leech, Faking It: Why Artificial Grass Makes Sense, NATIONAL (April 6, 2012), http://www
.thenational.ae/lifestyle/house-home/faking-it-why-artificial-grass-makes-sense.
158 See Rappaport, supra note 8, at 901 n.119 (explaining that nonpermeable surfaces in-
crease runoff).
159 See Mark Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205, 206–08, 248
(1974) (rejecting the utilitarian calculation that plastic trees cost less and last longer than real
trees). See generally Laurence H. Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional
Structures: Learning from Nature’s Future, 84 YALE L.J. 545 (1975); Laurence H. Tribe, Ways
Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315
(1974) (discussing the utility of nature and the natural).
160 Lindsey, supra note 6 (quoting Cristina Milesi) (internal quotation marks omitted).
161 See Rappaport, supra note 8, at 914 n.152 (providing examples of weed ordinance
language).
162 See Schindler, Of Backyard Chickens, supra note 60, at 241 (“[A]esthetics and the pre-
vention of blight, which could lead to a nuisance, are both of concern to the town in determining
what belongs in a front yard.”).
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II. REGULATING LAWNS
Change in environmental law and policy requires intentional ac-
tion.163  Such action can take the form of law (including mandates and
bans),164 norms,165 market-based mechanisms (including economic in-
centives),166 or architecture.167  Although scholars have shown an in-
creased interest in determining the appropriate regulatory scope for
individual behavior that impacts the environment,168 and have debated
which techniques would be most appropriate for different types of
harms,169 few have focused on bans.  Although some scholars and reg-
ulators view bans as too harsh and broad-stroked for the harms that
they target, they are currently used in some instances.170  Further,
worsening climate change might alter the physical and regulatory
landscape, necessitating a more stringent approach to regulation in
the future.171  In fact, many local ordinances that once seemed innocu-
163 See Doremus, Evolution, supra note 95, at 1093 (“Changes in law are always intentional,
chosen by some human agency.” (footnote omitted)).  Of note, even deregulation can be a form
of intentional action. See infra notes 215–16 and accompanying text.
164 Law “directs behavior in certain ways” and threatens individuals with sanctions if they
do not comply. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662
(1998).  By mandates, I mean laws that prohibit some action; that limit the extent of that action
or the conditions under which it may be taken; or that affirmatively require some course of
action. See Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW.
U. L. REV. 655, 659 (2006).  By bans, I mean the subset of mandates dealing with the complete
prohibition of a certain behavior or action.
165 Norms constrain behavior through community enforcement, not through some official
rule or source. See Lessig, supra note 164, at 662; Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law:
An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365, 365 (1997).
166 Lessig, supra note 164, at 663 (“Markets regulate through the device of price.”).  Al-
though technically economic incentives are a way that the law regulates markets, I will address
incentives along with markets.
167 See id. at 662–63.  In practice, it is hard to separate these categories from one another.
168 See generally JASON J. CZARNEZKI, EVERYDAY ENVIRONMENTALISM: LAW, NATURE &
INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR (2011). See also Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 91,
at 554.
169 See Gunnar S. Eskeland & Emmanuel Jimenez, Choosing Policy Instruments for Pollu-
tion Control: A Review (World Bank Working Paper No. 624, 1991), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1991/03/01/000009265_39610
01045114/Rendered/PDF/multi_pagepdf. See generally CZARNEZKI, supra note 168; SUNSTEIN,
RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 93.
170 For example, health concerns have led to bans on smoking and the use of asbestos. See
Julie Steenhuysen, Half of U.S. States Have Comprehensive Smoking Bans: CDC, REUTERS, Apr.
21, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/22/us-usa-smoking-idUS-
TRE73K6JM20110422; U.S. Federal Bans on Asbestos, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http:/
/www2.epagov/asbestos/us-federal-bans-asbestos (last updated Mar. 14. 2013).
171 Water shortage is already a pressing problem. See, e.g., Tim Gaynor & Steve Gorman,
Fast-Growing Western U.S. Cities Face Water Crisis, REUTERS, Mar. 11, 2009, available at http://
www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/11/us-water-cities-idUSTRE52A1WY20090311.
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ous—those limiting front yard cover to lawns, for instance—are now
being placed under the microscope as municipalities try to find many
small ways in which they can increase their sustainability.172  Because
“[c]limate change is a private property problem,” it will likely lead to
greater restrictions on individual behavior and the use of private
property.173
This Part first considers the benefits and shortcomings of regula-
tory methods other than law that could be used to reduce the predom-
inance of lawns in the United States.  It then brackets those
approaches, and focuses on the role that legal regulation might play.
It addresses arguments against relying on mandates and bans, but con-
cludes that those arguments are less compelling than their proponents
suggest, and that bans could serve an important role in alleviating
lawn-related harms in some instances.
A. Norm Change
The preeminent role of front lawns in the United States is due in
large part to a pervasive norm.174  Author Michael Pollan believes that
this norm involves “a deep distrust of individualistic approaches to the
landscape.  The land is too important to our identity as Americans to
To save precious water, some say, Californians will simply have to get rid of their
lawns.  Incredible suggestions are being made as water-saving alternatives.  Some
seem ridiculous, such as filling entire front yards with artificial plants and dyeing
lawns green.  Others sound sublime, such as replacing water-needy plants with
Mediterranean and California natives that can survive almost entirely on natural
rainfall.  There is talk among city and county officials not only of limits on how
much area around a home can be planted with turf and of “official” plant lists that
would mandate which plants can and cannot be grown, but of outright bans on
lawns.
Smaus, supra note 2.  The fact that the Los Angeles Times mentioned a lawn ban suggests that
this is a possibility that has at least been discussed, even if it has not yet been broadly adopted.
See id.
172 See Rappaport, supra note 8, at 918 n.165 (criticizing weed laws as “generally irrational
because enforcement of the prohibition does not further the articulated public safety and health
goals”).
173 See Paul Babie, Climate Change: Government, Private Property, and Individual Action,
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Winter 2011, at 19, 19.
174 See generally Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 359 (1997) (discussing lawn norms); see also Pollan, supra note 1
(“I daydreamed of scalping the entire yard.  But I didn’t do it—I continued to observe front-yard
conventions, mowing assiduously and locating all my new garden beds in the backyard.”).  The
norm, bolstered by ordinances, supports the idea that only lawns belong in front yards.  There is
some evidence that this norm is starting to change in some parts of the country, as front-yard
gardens are becoming legally and normatively acceptable. See Schindler, Of Backyard Chickens,
supra note 60, at 294–95.
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simply allow everyone to have his own way with it.”175  The strength of
the norm, evinced by the fear of social sanctions for failing to maintain
a neat front lawn, results in entrenchment despite the many harms
associated with lawns.176  The norm could be what Robert Ellickson
terms “welfare maximizing”—one that seeks to solve collective action
problems.177  Under this theory, the goal of the lawn norm might be
maximization of aggregate property value in a neighborhood.178  But
this norm appears to be self-reinforcing and circular—property value
is tied to lawns due, in part, to the historic expectation of lawns.  But
this is not because the lawn norm is inherently good or valuable; it is
because no one wants to defect from the norm for fear of social sanc-
tions (and because the norm has likely resulted in some having a true
preference for lawns).179  A locality interested in norm shift might con-
sider how it can change expectations about lawns and at the same time
protect property values if the neighborhood moves away from lawns.
In some instances, informational campaigns combined with other
tools can work to change norms,180 which can in turn result in more
175 Pollan, supra note 1 (“[C]ommon land, rather than race or tribe . . . makes us all Ameri-
cans . . . . once we decide that the land should serve as a vehicle of consensus, rather than an
arena of self-expression, the American lawn—collective, national, ritualized, and plain—begins
to look inevitable.”).  Of course, this norm could evolve.  Eventually, front yards might still look
identical, but not be filled by turf.  Further, norms vary by locality; not every U.S. neighborhood
follows the industrial lawn norm. See Eric A. Posner, Strategies of Constitutional Scholarship, 26
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 529, 542 (2001) (book review).
176 Tekle, supra note 16, at 228 (“[There] is a fear . . . that our neighbors will look down
upon or think less of us, subtle actions that may translate into the harsher acts of gossip, isola-
tion, and social excommunication or banishment because we have opted out of the front-lawn
social code.”).  Tekle describes the social sanctions imposed on Michael Pollan’s family when his
father stopped mowing the lawn, including neighbors slowly and angrily driving by the house,
and eventually resulting in self-imposed exile. Id. at 228–29 (citing MICHAEL POLLAN, SECOND
NATURE: A GARDENER’S EDUCATION 23–26 (paperback ed. 1992)).  See generally ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (discussing the
role of gossip in enforcing norms in certain tight-knit communities).
177 ELLICKSON, supra note 176, at 167 (hypothesizing that “members of a close-knit group
develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that mem-
bers obtain in their workaday affairs with one another”).
178 See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing property values in the context of
lawn norms); see also FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 30, at 5–6 (suggesting
that homeowners seek to preserve their home’s value, and therefore make self-interested regula-
tory decisions).
179 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 929
(1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms] (“[T]he deterrent effect of social norms on acts and
beliefs creates a sharp disjunction between public acts (including speech) and private thought.
Hence a state of affairs may persist even though there is widespread opposition to it.  And even-
tually the norms may affect private thought itself.” (footnote omitted)).
180 See Kuh, supra note 9, at 1118 (noting academic discussions of the important role of
informational and norm campaigns); see also id. at 1116 (“A public-information campaign de-
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environmentally responsible behavior.181  For example, a locality
could work to promote information about how much money a house-
hold could save by not watering its lawn; a similar approach has been
used in the context of energy efficiency.182  Norms are often slow to
change, however, even with the aid of informational campaigns.183
Sticky norms often persist even when they do not make much sense or
are harmful to the community.184  One commentator suggests that the
current lawn norm will only fade when more sustainable front yard
norms rapidly attract broad public interest.185  Perhaps this is begin-
ning to happen independently—members of the popular press have
begun to write about the growing interest in front-yard gardens and
the wastefulness of lawns,186 and certain thought-leader communities
are adopting policies to promote alternatives to standard lawns in re-
sponse to citizen demands.187  Although current norms might suggest
that homeowners would prefer to retain their existing lawns, a few
signed to encourage people to cease backyard burning is a regulation of norms designed to influ-
ence, and thereby to regulate indirectly, individual behaviors.”).
181 Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility, supra note 88, at 118 (discussing norm
change as a critical part of shaping an individual’s environmentally responsible behavior).
182 SARAH SCHINDLER, ENCOURAGING PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY
13–14 (2011) [hereinafter SCHINDLER, ENCOURAGING PRIVATE INVESTMENT], available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1805891 (University of Connecticut Center for En-
ergy and Environmental Law Policy Paper).
183 See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697,
1712–13 (1996) (attributing the stubbornness of norms and norm change to information lag and
coordination problems, where some are aware of new information that supports the abandon-
ment of an old norm, but others are not).
184 See McAdams, supra note 174, 372–75; see also Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard
Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607–08 (2000) (describing the
“sticky norms problem” as one where “the prevalence of a social norm makes decisionmakers
reluctant to carry out a law intended to change that norm” and suggesting that the law is not
always effective at changing norms).
185 See Tekle, supra note 16, at 230 (“[R]eal change concerning the front residential land-
scape benefitting waterways will take place only when ‘green’ front-lawn social norms embracing
diverse residential landscapes ‘go viral.’”).
186 See Bittman, supra note 71; Steven Kurutz, The Battlefront in the Front Yard, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2012, at D1; Steven Kurutz, Giving Gardens a Hand, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/garden/in-santa-monica-calif-gardens-and-gardeners-are-
welcomehtml; see also SARA STEIN, NOAH’S GARDEN: RESTORING THE ECOLOGY OF OUR OWN
BACK YARDS 244 (1993) (positing that perhaps “at some time in the future, the value of a prop-
erty will be perceived in part according to its value to wildlife.  A property hedged with fruiting
shrubs will be worth more than one bordered by forsythia.”); Tekle, supra note 16, at 225
(“[S]imply posing the question of what landscapes are acceptable to front a dwelling or even
challenging it in the form of ‘dissident’ landscapes, suggests a slow march to overthrowing the
standard-form front lawn and replacing it with landscape choice.”); Petrangelo, supra note 141,
at 779.
187 See Schindler, Of Backyard Chickens, supra note 60, at 236.
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pioneering communities could lead to an avalanche of changing pref-
erences.188  Further, movement away from an entrenched norm might
occur more naturally when the historic norm is shown to be harmful in
contemporary settings.189
It is also possible, however, that something stronger, like man-
dates, might be necessary to force more rapid change surrounding an
entrenched norm.190  Because climate change problems are intensify-
ing and the current drought is worsening the water scarcity problems
in much of the country,191 immediate action is necessary.  Further,
while the harms from norm defection are internalized in the first per-
son in the neighborhood to replace a lawn with xeriscaping—she risks
damaging her property value and angering her neighbors for little (cu-
mulative) environmental benefit—harms from maintaining lawns are
188 See Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 179, at 912 (describing “[n]orm cascades [that]
occur when societies experience rapid shifts toward new norms”).  Communities could usher in
change by demonstrating the relationship between a new form of behavior (e.g., lawn alterna-
tives) and values that others hold in high regard (e.g., environmentalism). See Amitai Etzioni,
Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 157, 169 (2000).
Under those circumstances, homeowner preferences would point towards legal change.
189 See Stern, supra note 86, at 413 (describing norm change as a process that is driven by
awareness of adverse consequences to the things that people value); see also Smaus, supra note 2
(“Even without threats from city governments, some gardeners have already said their farewells
to front lawns, the least used of lawns.  ‘I got sick and tired of pushing a lawn mower for almost
80 years,’ says [a Los Angeles man], who tore out an aging Bermuda-grass lawn and replaced it
with various succulents and ground covers . . . . ‘All that mowing, edging, fertilizing and weeding
got to me.’”).
190 See Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 179, at 910 (“Some norms are obstacles to
human well-being and autonomy.  It is appropriate for law to alter norms if they diminish well-
being . . . .”).  Recently, governments have attempted to impose mandates to force norm change
with respect to limits on the size of sugary drinks and on smoking in public spaces. See Jill
Colvin, New York Soda Ban Approved: Board of Health OKs Limiting Sale of Large-Sized,
Sugary Drinks, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 13, 2012, 11:37 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/-
2012/09/13/new-york-approves-soda-ban-big-sugarydrinks_n_1880868html (describing New York
City’s attempted prohibition on the sale of “sugar-sweetened drinks in cups larger than 16
ounces”); U.S. Smoking Bans, State by State, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/02/23/smoking-bans-state-by-sta_n_826672html (last updated May 25, 2011) (“In the U.S.,
38 states have some kind of state-wide legislated action banning smoking . . . .”).  One commen-
tator suggests that the use of reusable bags instead of plastic bags at the grocery store is an
example of norm change.  Tekle, supra note 16, at 242.  However, in some localities public laws
have been enacted banning plastic bags. See, e.g., LONG BEACH, CAL., CODE § 8.62.020 (Supp. 2,
2013) (prohibiting stores from providing customers with plastic carryout bags).  Other municipal-
ities have incentivized reduced plastic bag use by providing a discount for using a reusable bag or
charging for using a nonreusable bag. See, e.g., LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 12.85.040
(2010) (requiring stores that provide recyclable paper bags to customers to charge ten cents for
each bag provided).  Thus, it  is not clear that the norms changed without the help of public law
in this instance.
191 See Editorial, supra note 3.
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broadly dispersed.  Law is useful at coordinating behavior in the face
of collective action problems and helps internalize externalities.192
B. Markets and Incentives
Many governments view market-based strategies as an efficient
tool for abating pollution.193  There is similar potential for incentives
to play an important role in furthering sustainable policies in the face
of water scarcity and climate change.194  With respect to limiting the
existence of lawns, there are a number of possible market-based solu-
tions and incentives that would effectively impose stiff economic pen-
alties on those who choose to maintain a lawn.  Some of these would
directly relate to water usage.  Although many do not realize it, water
in the United States is dramatically subsidized,195 leading to “ridicu-
lously low” water prices.196  Thus, localities could charge consumers
the true marginal cost of water in order to disincentivize wasteful
water usage, including use on lawns.197
One example of a water conservation incentive is progressive
block pricing for water usage.198  Under this scheme, a baseline of
water usage is priced moderately, but each additional increment of
192 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348
(1967) (“A primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater
internalization of externalities.”); Epstein, supra note 135, at 747.
193 Glenn P. Jenkins & Ranjit Lamech, Market-Based Incentive Instruments for Pollution
Control, INT’L BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION BULL., Nov. 1992, at 523, 524, available at
http://jdintl.econ.queensu.ca/publications/qed_dp_99pdf.
194 These are not pure market mechanisms.  They are a hybrid of law and market regula-
tion, in part because we do not have pure markets for public utilities like water. See, e.g., Craig
Anthony Arnold, Privatization of Public Water Services: The States’ Role in Ensuring Public
Accountability, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 561, 579–80 (2005).
195 See generally Tekle, supra note 16, at 241 n.117.
196 Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1873,
1882–84 (2005) (discussing the elimination of water subsidies).
197 Jenkins & Lamech, supra note 193, at 524 (discussing incentives and market-based
mechanisms for addressing environmental harms, stating that “[e]conomic theory suggests that if
the monetary value of the environmental damage . . . can be determined, an environmental
charge equal to the cost of damage could be established to serve as a disincentive for environ-
mentally harmful behaviour”).
198 See Hawes, supra note 147, at 10 (“On the residential side, the greatest opportunity to
save [water] occurs regarding outdoor use.  Incentives to encourage outdoor conservation in-
clude metering coupled with rate structures that reflect actual water use: the more a household
uses, the more it pays and vice versa.”); Residential Water Rates, TUALATIN VALLEY WATER
DISTRICT, http://www.tvwd.org/customer-services/residential-water-rates.aspx (last visited Feb.
15, 2014); Water Rates: Conserving Water and Protecting Revenue, SW. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIS-
TRICT, http://www.swfwmd.state.fl.us/conservation/waterrates/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2014) (“With-
out decreasing revenues, utilities can lower water use by using inclining block rates, that is, water
price increases with increasing blocks of water use.”).
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water used is priced higher.199  Because conventional lawns consume
such a large amount of water, affected homeowners might respond to
increased water prices by watering their lawns less frequently or re-
moving and replacing them with less water-intensive options (assum-
ing the local ordinances permit them to do so).200  These incentives
tied to water usage would serve to treat water more like a commodity
by forcing consumers to pay for its actual value.201
Other incentives might relate directly to lawns.  For example,
some municipalities and water districts pay people to tear up their
existing lawns.202  Although it is not clear why governments should
pay people to avoid harming others, lawn removal and replacement
can be expensive, and this approach has had some success in Las
Vegas.203  Local governments could also impose a “lawn tax,”204 which
would allow people to maintain their lawns, but would require them
199 Similar techniques are used with energy pricing. See Kuh, supra note 9, at 1128
(describing “pricing mechanisms” including “charging more for energy use above a set
baseline”).
200 But see Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jack Barkenbus & Jonathan Gilligan, Individual Car-
bon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2008) (citing research
that suggests that price signals may have only a limited effect on behavior).
201 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water as a Public Commodity, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 17,
24–25 (2011) (addressing subsidization of water).  Another water-based incentive would provide
rebates for installing water-efficient devices. See, e.g., SCOTTSDALE, ARIZ., CODE § 49-243(d)(5)
(Supp. 64, 2013) (rebating property owners the lesser of cost or $250 per unit for installation of
programmable irrigation controllers).
202 See, e.g., SCOTTSDALE, ARIZ., CODE § 49-243(d)(3) (offering rebates to single-family
residential customers up to $1500 and commercial and multifamily customers up to $3000 for
removing turf and replanting with low-water use landscaping); North Marin Water District Con-
servation, N. MARIN WATER DISTRICT, http://www.nmwd.com/conservation_exterior.php (last
visited Feb. 15, 2014) (describing the North Marin Water District’s “Cash-for-Grass” rebate pro-
gram that pays residential customers fifty dollars per 100 square feet of lawn removed and con-
verted to native low-water-use landscape or synthetic turf).
203 See S. NEV. WATER AUTH., A REGIONAL SOLUTION: MILESTONES 1991–2011, at 7, 15
(2012), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Interim/76th2011/Exhibits/Lands/E050412B-1pdf
(“The SNWA’s . . . rebate program is one of the most successful initiatives of its kind in the
world.  The . . . rebate program has resulted in the conversion of more than 157 million square
feet of lawn to water-efficient landscaping, saving Southern Nevada more than 8.7 billion gallons
annually.”); Water Smart Landscapes Rebate, S. NEV. WATER AUTHORITY, http://www.snwa
.com/rebates/wslhtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2014) (describing the rebate program).  The money for
this program comes from federal grants, water service delivery and connection charges, usage
fees, sales tax, and municipal bonds. See S. NEV. WATER AUTH., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 12, 29
(2012), available at http://www.snwa.com/assets/pdf/about_reports_annualpdf; U.S. DEP’T OF IN-
TERIOR, WATERSMART WATER AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAM AND WATER CONSERVA-
TION FIELD SERVICES GRANTS: WATER SMART LANDSCAPE REBATE PROGRAM IN CLARK
COUNTY, NEVADA 1 (2010), available at http://www.usbrgov/lc/region/g2000/envdocs/Water-
Smart_SNWA_Final_Supp_EA_and_FONSI_09-27-2010pdf; see also North Marin Water District
Conservation, supra note 202 (describing a similar program run by the North Marin Water Dis-
trict).  Of course, these are not pure market-based solutions.  They are a combination of markets
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to pay a price to do so.  The tax could be coupled with and fund an
incentive payment for the removal of existing lawns.205  In the alterna-
tive, a locality could decide to grant a tax credit or reduction to those
individuals who opt to remove their lawns, or who instead plant envi-
ronmentally friendly landscapes.206  This would alleviate the need to
find a positive funding source for the incentive.
While they offer numerous avenues for change, market-based
mechanisms and incentives also raise some concerns.  For example,
Professor Doremus suggests that markets will not adequately protect
public, collective interests, but rather “[c]hanges to underlying prop-
erty rules will be needed if those interests are to be sustained.”207  She
posits that markets will only look after private interests; regulation
through law is best suited to protect “public values,” including the
quality of the environment.208  Thus, to effectively protect the many
aspects of the environment that are public goods, including things like
biodiversity and ecosystem services, individuals will need to sacrifice
some control over private property usage.  More broadly, one com-
mentator warns against a global commodities market for water, draw-
ing analogies to problems associated with derivatives and mortgage-
backed securities as well as food prices, food shortages, and
speculation.209
and legal regulation, and they may be aimed at changing norms.  In practice, various mechanisms
of regulation overlap and influence each other.
204 See Editorial, Unthinkable? A Lawn Tax, GUARDIAN (Apr. 6, 2012, 4:56PM), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/apr/06/editorial-unthinkable-lawn-tax (suggesting that
“a tax on private lawns beyond a certain size is within the gift of every chancellor”).
205 The tax proceeds could be remitted to fund lawn removal programs.
206 For example, New Jersey is currently entertaining a bill that would provide taxpayers
owning property within 1000 feet of Barnegat Bay and its tributaries with a recurring annual
state tax credit of $250 for replacing grass lawns on their property with stones, crushed shells, or
other materials that require no chemical agents.  Gen. Assemb. No. 406, 215th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2012).  A Florida statute requires water districts to encourage local governments
to incentivize landscaping that decreases water usage, eliminates invasive species, and limits the
amount of ground that can be covered by turfgrass. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.185 (West Supp.
2013); see also WaterSaver Landscape Rebate, SAN ANTONIO WATER SYS., http://www.saws.org/
Conservation/Outdoor/LandscapeRebate/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2014) (rebating customers up to
$400 if no more than fifty percent of their landscape is planted in turf, their shrubs and flowers
are selected from an approved list, they plant shade trees, and no more than five percent of their
landscape is annuals or unapproved plants).
207 See Doremus, Evolution, supra note 95, at 1091, 1119 (also noting that “markets typi-
cally underprovide public goods”—including environmental quality—due to free-rider
problems).
208 See id. at 1119.  This critique might apply with less force to quasi-market forces like tax
incentives.
209 See Frederick Kaufman, Wall Street’s Thirst for Water, 490 NATURE 469, 471 (2012).
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Further, regulation via incentive is inherently tied to norms.  If
people care more about the benefits that they receive from their lawns
than the benefits they would receive from an incentive, they may not
take action pursuant to that incentive; the norm may be stronger than
the incentive, especially for wealthy individuals who do not need the
monetary benefit.  The incentive might even reinforce the norm
among the wealthy because it increases the cost of maintaining the
lawn, turning the lawn into a sort of Veblen good.210  Thus, incentives
might further segregate rich and poor neighborhoods, and function as
a form of exclusionary zoning with rich neighborhoods being defined
by their ability to afford lawns.  Of course, as localities should prima-
rily care about the cumulative harms associated with lawn mainte-
nance, the existence of a few holdouts is acceptable, and economic
theory would suggest that so long as the incentive price is set cor-
rectly, most households will participate.211
C. Architecture
Architectural solutions—“features of the world”—are almost al-
ways difficult to decouple from the other vectors of regulation.212  For
example, one could argue that building up to the property line but
installing a green roof, harvesting rainfall to water lawns, or separat-
ing the drinking water supply from the nonpotable water system, are
architectural solutions.  Each alters the built world in a way that
reduces lawns or mitigates their harms.  To the extent that a munici-
pality neither expressly permits nor forbids those behaviors, perhaps
they are architectural solutions.  But in the realm of land use and
lawns, legal intervention into architecture (e.g., setbacks, rainwater
capture prohibitions, and water distribution network design) and mar-
kets (e.g., water pricing)—and their resulting influence on social
norms—all but guarantees that there are no pure design solutions.
Much like markets and norms, architectural solutions cannot be
decoupled from changes to existing legal structures.213
210 The expense of a Veblen good makes it desirable as a status symbol. See Richard H.
McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 39–40 (1992); see also It’s Expensive, So It Must
Be Good, ECONOMIST (Sept. 2, 2009, 3:09 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/
2009/09/its_expensive_so_it_must_be_go.
211 See Sharon Beder, Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection, ECODATE, July
2001, at 6, 7 (“In the case of price-based measures, their effectiveness will depend on whether
the prices or charges are high enough.”).
212 Lessig, supra note 164, at 662–63.
213 See id. at 664.
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Further, perhaps the greatest architectural change has already
happened—climate change and drought.  Although localities are
working against this change via mitigation techniques, they are also
beginning to implement adaptation measures in response.214  Put sim-
ply, the physical world that we have created by our behavior is, in
many parts of the country, one that is less hospitable to lawns.  So, if
we choose to maintain lawns at their current levels in the face of that
change, it will require even more substantial legal and market
intervention.
Deregulation might offer an attractive first step.  Local govern-
ments could begin to address lawn harms by removing existing restric-
tions that encourage lawns: weed laws and setback requirements.
Although this would not actively incentivize individuals to stop main-
taining industrial-style lawns, it would allow them to do so.215  If der-
egulation in conjunction with norm change was not sufficient to
address the harms, affirmative mandates could be adopted to force
lawn replacement.  Any autonomy concerns would be managed if the
municipality allowed various alternatives—xeriscaping, vegetable gar-
dens, etc.—with which a homeowner could replace the lawn.216
D. Law: Mandates and Bans
As lawn-related harms become more pressing, it is likely that der-
egulation alone will not be sufficient; localities may turn to the afore-
mentioned regulatory methods to foster sustainability and ensure
harm reduction.  Although incentives may be sufficient to reduce
water consumption and alleviate other lawn-related harms at the pre-
sent time, mandated reductions in water consumption might be a
more important policy tool in the future.  Further, legal regulation en-
compasses varying levels of strictness—from mandated reductions to
outright bans.217  This Section addresses some concerns with legal reg-
214 See Sally Kane & Jason F. Shogren, Linking Adaptation and Mitigation in Climate
Change Policy, 45 CLIMATIC CHANGE 75, 85 (2000).
215 When property owners are free to use their land as they wish, they will theoretically use
it efficiently and for its highest and best use. See Schindler, Of Backyard Chickens, supra note
60, at 282–83 (discussing the theory supporting deregulation and the economic benefits of der-
egulated property); see also Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 720 (1986).
216 See Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 179, at 961 (“A citizen can be understood as
autonomous insofar as she is able to choose among a set of reasonably good options and to be
reflective and deliberative about her choice.”).
217 A ban entirely outlawing all turfgrass is an extremely restrictive form of mandate—“the
most burdensome regulatory option.” See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201,
1215–16 (5th Cir. 1991) (discussing the retroactive asbestos ban).  However, a municipality could
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ulation, but also discusses why these solutions may be appropriate to
address the harms associated with lawns in the future.
As a starting point, it is important to acknowledge that, at the
present time, pervasive lawn regulation is unlikely in all but the most
drought-ridden areas.  This is in part because mandates—and espe-
cially bans—are often seen as unlikely or politically untenable for a
number of reasons.  First, they are generally disfavored and unpopu-
lar.218  Public choice theory suggests that mandates—those that would
provide amorphous benefits to the community at large, but would sub-
stantially burden individual homeowners—would not garner enough
organized support to persuade local politicians to implement them.219
Further, some commentators suggest that mandates are politically un-
likely because laws will not change until the norms underlying those
laws change.220  But this argument is specious because it ignores the
instead simply limit the amount of ground area that turfgrass can occupy. See, e.g., Benke, supra
note 75, at 5 (discussing Albuquerque, and noting that “[w]ith water becoming scarce . . . the city
is restricting the cultivation of lawns . . . [by] limit[ing] high-water-use lawns to just 20 percent of
any new home lot”).
218 See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 164, at 659–62 (criticizing mandates); Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation Can Protect the En-
vironment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101, 1103 (2005) (“Regulations that seek to direct personal be-
havior by fiat are exceedingly unpopular.”); see also Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at
1215–16 (petitioners describing the EPA ban on existing and future asbestos use as the “death
penalty alternative”); Kuh, supra note 9, at 1120 n.21 (stating that “even if such mandates were
adopted, they would engender public outcry and be repealed or disobeyed”).
219 Public choice theory suggests that “[t]here is no public or general or social interest,
there are only concatenations of particular interests or private preferences.”  Frank I.
Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of
Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 148 (1977–1978).
220 See, e.g., Kuh, supra note 9, at 1117–18; Tekle, supra note 16, at 239.  In her informative
article about lawns, Professor Tekle addresses the idea of a ban on lawns only briefly and dismis-
sively.  She states:
In the absence of meaningful cultural change, government mandates in the form of
public law requiring or even suggesting alternative landscapes likely will not work.
In theory, 160 years of front lawn norms could be changed by the stroke of the
mayor and town council’s pen, but in practice, this change is likely highly illusory.
Citizens may find it difficult to comply with the new laws, and, consequently, local
officials may find it difficult to enforce them.  Once culture catches up with science,
then the law, as a reflection of societal values, can catch up with culture.
Tekle, supra note 16, at 239 (footnote omitted).  This discussion seems to conflate the issues of
power to enact a ban with its subsequent enforcement.  The fact that enforcement might be
difficult (although this author would suggest otherwise, especially if the ban only covers front
yards) does not weaken the police power justifications for the passage of a ban in the first place.
Further, Professor Tekle fails to explain why such a ban would be “illusory” and “will not work,”
especially given the fact that other sustainability mandates, such as green building ordinances,
have been quite successful.
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fact that norm change often follows legal change, and that the police
power is broad enough to lead despite opposing norms.221
Although widespread lawn bans are currently unlikely, climate
change may put many of these issues on the table; “[c]risis can lower
political barriers to legal change.”222  Some would call the current
drought in many parts of the United States a crisis,223 and looking for-
ward, climate scientists almost universally predict that radical, cata-
strophic changes in the natural environment will soon occur as a direct
result of climate change.224  In times of national crisis, policies that
were previously politically untenable—or even viewed as illegal or un-
constitutional—may become the controlling policies to address the
problems that are causing the crisis.225  As more individuals in more
parts of the country feel the effects of severe water shortage, pollu-
221 See supra note 190.
222 Doremus, Evolution, supra note 95, at 1115.
223 See, e.g., Brad Plumer, As Food Prices Spike, How Close Is the World to Another Cri-
sis?, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Aug. 9, 2012, 10:51 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
wonkblog/wp/2012/08/09/-could-the-u-s-drought-trigger-another-global-food-crisis/.
224 See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 11–12 tbl.SPM.2 (2008) (noting that in Australia and New Zealand, “[b]y
2020, significant loss of biodiversity is projected to occur in some ecologically rich sites”); ORG.
FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., Climate Change, in OECD ENVIRONMENTAL OUTLOOK TO
2050: THE CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION 71, 87 (2012) (“By 2020, between 75 and 250 million
people [in Africa] are projected to be exposed to increased water stress . . . .”).
225 See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 409 (1998) (“During
normal politics, the center of American politics is occupied by politicians and parties content
with interstitial modifications of the existing regime. . . . While there are many groups devoted to
fundamental reform, each wants to transform the system in very different ways, and none can
plausibly claim to set the agenda for the mainstream of American opinion.  That is what changes
during a constitutional moment. . . . [A] broad movement of transformative opinion has now
earned the authority to set major aspects of the political agenda.”); see also Walter Dean Burn-
ham, Constitutional Moments and Punctuated Equilibria: A Political Scientist Confronts Bruce
Ackerman’s We the People, 108 YALE L.J. 2237, 2246 (1999) (describing Ackerman’s “view that
in constitutional moment crises the public is also transformed for the duration of the crisis.  It
becomes energized, mobilized, and, even less plausibly, proactive rather than reactive, as it usu-
ally is.  At these times, the public can and sometimes does lead politicians, rather than the other
way around.”); Mark Tushnet, The Flag-Burning Episode: An Essay on the Constitution, 61 U.
COLO. L. REV. 39, 47–48 (1990) (stating that Ackerman distinguishes “between times of ordinary
politics, when the mundane and routine dominate the nation’s consideration of political issues,
and . . . . constitutional moments, [when] the public is attentive to fundamental issues of constitu-
tional government—we consider what sort of government we want to have, we consider what
kinds of limits we want to place on that government, and, most important, we recognize that the
arrangements we put in place will persist for a relatively long time.”); Philip J. Weiser, Note,
Ackerman’s Proposal for Popular Constitutional Lawmaking: Can It Realize His Aspirations for
Dualist Democracy?, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 907, 907 (1993) (suggesting that in Ackerman’s view,
“the public will muster sufficient support to enact constitutional referendum proposals only in
those times of crisis which he terms ‘constitutional moments’”).
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tion, and climate change,226 they may become more likely to support
policies previously thought to be radical, as well as the politicians who
adopt those policies, in order to target crisis-related harms.227
Another concern is that mandates directed at individuals some-
times suffer from an “intrusion objection,” which involves opposition
to a perceived invasion of “privacy or other civil liberties in a manner
unpalatable to the public.”228  Many believe that banning the actions
of private citizens impinges too substantially on private rights, includ-
ing private property rights.229  Challenges to land use ordinances are
often founded in general libertarian property rights theory, the idea
being that the fewer regulations on the use of the property there are
the better, as this will foster more efficient use of property.230  These
views relate to lawns because “[a] strong view of private property em-
226 One could argue that this is already happening. See, e.g., Climate Change Facts: An-
swers to Common Questions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://epagov/climatechange/
factshtml (last updated Sept. 9, 2013) (noting that the rise in global temperatures has been ac-
companied by more intense storms, more frequent and severe heat waves, and rising sea levels,
which have “already put coastal homes, beaches, roads, bridges, and wildlife at risk”).
227 An important distinction between this idea and Ackerman’s concept of constitutional
moments is that currently, according to the analysis set forth in this Article, these bans are al-
ready “legal,” even if they are applied retroactively. Cf. Gregg Costa, Note, John Marshall, the
Sedition Act, and Free Speech in the Early Republic, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1011, 1012 n.7 (1999)
(noting that “Ackerman’s influential theory of ‘constitutional moments’ . . . posits that political
crises can result in fundamental constitutional reinterpretation”).  They are not, however, likely
politically tenable in most jurisdictions at the present time.  This is the key tie-in to Ackerman’s
ideas.  In times of crisis, the idea of a lawn mandate may become sufficiently politically palatable
to withstand challenges, or at least to withstand the removal of those public elected officials who
passed the ordinances imposing the bans.
228 Kuh, supra note 9, at 1119–20; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”), overruled by Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Babcock, Global Climate
Change, supra note 30, at 5–6 (describing individual mandates as “costly” and likely to “trigger
enormous political resistance because of the interference with individual liberty and invasion of
privacy”); Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV, supra note 91, at 598 (noting concerns with
the “intrusiveness” of enforcing mandates on individual behavior which might “undermine com-
pliance or produce a political backlash”).
229 There is a prevailing cultural view that Americans “accept that individual landowners
rightly ought to be vested with decisions about how best to use” their land.  Timothy Beatley &
Richard C. Collins, Americanizing Sustainability: Place-Based Approaches to the Global Chal-
lenge, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 193, 212 (2002); see also Hawes, supra note 147,
at 10 (“Elected officials may consider conservation [to be the same as] ending green lawns and
therefore politically unpalatable.  Water users might think conservation is inconvenient or inter-
fering with private property rights.”).
230 See Epstein, supra note 135, at 761–63.  It is worth noting that the liberty objection
seems to entrench weak property owner preferences.  What people value in their neighborhoods
is consistency; they do not want their yard to be an outlier. See supra notes 62–65 and accompa-
nying text.  Once a shift away from lawns occurs, however, whether through norm pioneering or
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powers the landowner to do what she wishes with her yard.”231  In-
deed, property rights proponents believe that having a lawn is a
right—a form of democracy.232  Even proponents of natural land-
scapes sometimes take this view, assuming that there is a right to envi-
ronmentally unfriendly landscapes, and ignoring the strength of the
police powers.233  One commentator suggests that “it would stretch
our customary understanding of the appropriate role of regulation to
attempt to mandate that an owner . . . systematically remove invasive
species.”234  Although the police power is broad, local governments
are still quite deferential to property rights, and thus often fail to pass
otherwise legally permissible ordinances that would support principles
of sustainability and biodiversity.235
However, “the right to use one’s real property as desired, histori-
cally cherished as it is, was never conceived as absolute.”236  And, as
previously discussed, local governments already regulate lawns in the
United States via weed ordinances, front-yard garden bans, and set-
back requirements.237  This effectively eliminates the libertarian argu-
ment because the government already interferes with individual lawn
choice.  Because individuals own property subject to the government’s
police power, governments have the ability to “redefine the content of
legal regulation, one could imagine property owners readily embracing xeriscaping, front yard
gardens, or synthetic lawns.
231 Smith, supra note 11, at 215.
232 Beatriz Colomina, The Lawn at War: 1941–1961, in THE AMERICAN LAWN 135, 149
(Georges Teyssot ed., 1999) (“The lawn represents democracy . . . . Everybody can have a lawn.
The lawn is a right . . . .”).
233 See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 8, at 927 (arguing for natural landscapes, but stating,
seemingly non-ironically, that “[p]eople have a right to astro-turf-covered stoops, closely
cropped evergreens, and spinning plastic sun-flowers in their yards.  That is the American
way.”); Bittman, supra note 71 (advocating for turning lawns into gardens, but stating, “I’m not
going to argue that we should be limiting the size or number of lawns”).
234 John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying Land Owners to Protect the Environment,
26 J. LAND, RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 14 (2005).
235 See Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L.
REV. 325, 346 (2002) (“Despite an underappreciated history of substantial regulation, real prop-
erty has somehow become an iconic symbol of individual liberty in America.  Landowners as-
sume that they are or should be free to use their land in virtually any way they please, so long as
other people are not directly injured by that use.  Because that assumption is widespread and
politically powerful, the effort to impose the kinds of regulatory controls on land use that are
essential to biodiversity protection faces particularly formidable institutional barriers.” (footnote
omitted)).  This is beginning to change, as more local governments are beginning to impose
sustainability requirements such as green building mandates. See Sarah B. Schindler, Following
Industry’s LEED®: Municipal Adoption of Private Green Building Standards, 62 FLA. L. REV.
285, 285 (2010) [hereinafter Schindler, Following Industry’s LEED].
236 Smith, supra note 11, at 215.
237 See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
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property rights.”238  The key is striking the appropriate balance be-
tween regulatory control and honoring the autonomy interest in using
one’s property as one wishes.
The collective fear of imposing mandates—both from the per-
spective of academics and policymakers—might also be unfounded
and less formidable than imagined.239  That this fear is overstated is
evidenced by the fact that “sustainability mandates”240 are becoming
more common.  Courts have long recognized that the exercise of the
police power “must become wider, more varied, and frequent, with
the progress of society,”241 and local government trends toward sus-
tainable policies are an example of that progress.  For example, green
building ordinances, which require private developers to construct
their private development projects to meet certain levels of energy
efficiency or sustainable design, are now quite common.242  Some com-
munities restrict leaf blower usage on “ozone action” days;243 others
limit whether and when people can wash their cars or water their
lawns;244 and in some areas, residents are required to separate their
238 Serkin, supra note 133, at 1259.  But most discussion of property rights focuses on their
strengthening over time, and that this strengthening leads to increases in growth and develop-
ment.  Doremus, Evolution, supra note 95, at 1095 (“[T]he [scholarly] focus has remained prima-
rily on the initial emergence and subsequent strengthening of individuated property rights as a
reaction to the inefficiencies of collective ownership.  The tacit assumption seems to be that
change should uniformly run in the direction of increased property rights, because stronger
property rights mean increased economic development and growth.” (footnote omitted)).  Al-
though it is understood that governments do at times use law to weaken private property rights,
such action is viewed by some as “an aberration.” Id. at 1095 n.16.  Thus, the proposal in this
Article suggesting a ban on lawns is counter to the general trend.  One method of climate change
adaptation is changing property rules, which are motivated by recognition of the shared sacrifice
that will be necessary to confront a changing climate. See id. at 1092 (“The changes that climate
change calls for will largely be toward weaker, rather than stronger, individual property rights.
Strong property rights encourage moral hazard, increasing the costs of adaptation to a warmer
world, and may stand directly in the way of societal adaptation.”).
239 Kuh, supra note 9, at 1112 (“[T]here are reasons to believe that the cost and feasibility
of imposing mandates on environmentally significant individual behaviors may be less daunting
than widely imagined.”).
240 I use this term to mean mandates or bans, imposed via public law, that aim to require or
curtail an action that can lead to a more sustainable environment, and perhaps reduce some
negative impacts associated with climate change.
241 See Bos. & Me. R.R. Co. v. Cnty. Comm’rs of York, 10 A. 113, 114 (Me. 1887).
242 See generally Schindler, Following Industry’s LEED, supra note 235. Green building
ordinances may be distinguishable, as they often only apply to large development projects or
commercial enterprises, see id. at 312, and not to single-family residential homeowners—the
group that would be most directly impacted by a retroactive lawn ban.
243 CZARNEZKI, supra note 168, at 46.
244 See Kuh, supra note 9, at 1140 n.110 (discussing limits on car washing); id. at 1133 (“Mu-
nicipalities also commonly adopt water-conservation ordinances that prohibit or limit the time or
duration of outdoor water use, require the use of hoses that have an automatic shut-off nozzle,
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recyclables from their trash.245  Some municipalities have placed re-
strictions on watering golf courses246 and at least one prohibits restric-
tive covenants that require turfgrass.247  Even affirmative removal
mandates are not unheard of.  For example, many cities require home-
owners to remove snow from the sidewalks in front of their homes.248
From a private law perspective, some intentional communities are be-
ginning to incorporate sustainability mandates—including bans on
gas-powered mowers, leaf-blowers, and industrial fertilizers—into
their CC&Rs.249
Further, a lawn ban should suffer less risk of an intrusion objec-
tion than other mandates on individual behaviors because a lawn ban
is primarily a property restriction, not a direct restriction on individual
behaviors.250  Of course, a ban on lawns de facto regulates individual
bar the washing of impervious surfaces, or require the installation of low-flow fixtures before the
sale or major modification of a residential home.”).  One locality has prohibited the “non-benefi-
cial use of water.” RIO RANCHO, N.M., CODE §§ 52.01–.09 (2013).  Thus, if the city of Rio
Rancho decided to define lawns as a “non-beneficial use,” their existing ordinance might be
interpreted to ban the watering of lawns, and thus could lead to the demise of the lawns them-
selves. See id.; see also GARDEN GROVE, CAL., CODE §§ 14.40.042–.044 (2012) (during a stage 2
water alert, restricts watering to every other day on an odd/even basis; during a stage 3 water
warning, restricts watering to twice a week on an odd/even basis and prohibits watering between
6 AM and 6 PM; during a stage 4 water emergency, prohibits all watering); PASCO COUNTY,
FLA., CODE § 62-98 (Supp. 60, 2013) (restricts the watering of established lawns to once per
week, except by hand).
245 Kuh, supra note 9, at 1132 n.60 (citing, e.g., S.F., CAL., ENVIR. CODE §§ 1901–1912
(2011) and NANTUCKET, MASS., CODE §§ 125-2, -5 (2009)).
246 See, e.g., DOTHAN, ALA., CODE § 102-166 (Supp. 35, 2013) (prohibiting watering of golf
course fairways during a water emergency); LAS VEGAS VALLEY WATER DISTRICT SERVICE
RULES § 12.6(B) (2013), available at http://www.lvvwd.com/assets/pdf/serv_rules_fulldocpdf (re-
quiring golf courses using District supplied water to conform to a water budget, pay a surcharge
for exceeding the budget, and submit water use reduction plans).
247 DENVER, COLO., CODE § 57-100 (Supp. 114, 2013) (prospectively prohibiting restrictive
covenants that require turfgrass).
248 The majority of courts considering these ordinances have found them to be valid exer-
cises of the police power. See, e.g., State v. McMahon, 55 A. 591, 593 (Conn. 1903); State v.
Small, 137 A. 398, 399 (Me. 1927); Flynn v. Canton Co. of Balt., 40 Md. 312, 324 (1874).
249 See Amy Bray, How to Create a Green Community, PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., July 2008,
at 47, 48–50 (suggesting prohibition of leaf blowers and lawn mowers that are gas-powered, as
they generate pollution and excessive noise, and stating, “[w]ith respect to landscaping, require
use of native plants in landscaping, including wildflowers.  Use guidelines to minimize lawn areas
and encourage tree planting.”); Ross Jackson, The Ecovillage Movement, PERMACULTURE MAG.,
Summer 2004, at 25, 25–29.  Bray suggests that “requiring vast expansive lawns [is a] practice[ ]
that [is] not appropriate in a community that seeks to be environmentally responsible and ig-
nores the growing trend favoring environmental responsibility in everyday choices.”  Bray,
supra, at 52.
250 See Kuh, supra note 9, at 1128–29 n.46 (distinguishing mandates that regulate individu-
als from those that regulate architecture, and specifically identifying zoning ordinances and
green building codes as “mandates directed to individuals at the juncture of construction or
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behavior, because individual action is inherently limited by property
restrictions, but that is not a lawn ban’s primary purpose.251  Further,
while many environmentally significant individual behaviors are con-
ducted in private inside the home, this is not so with respect to lawns,
on which all activities are conducted outside the home.252  Thus, the
intrusion concerns related to privacy and civil liberties should be less
pronounced in the face of a property restriction that only indirectly
limits publicly visible behaviors.
Finally, as the effects of climate change make themselves more
evident to citizens and policymakers, the externalities associated with
environmentally significant individual behaviors should emerge as a
natural target of regulation.253  Regulation serves as a means of forc-
ing internalization of externalities, which is often necessary in the con-
text of environmental law.254  Indeed, “[m]ost economic theorists
recognize that some level of environmental regulation is necessary be-
cause environmental problems frequently involve significant external-
ities, require solutions that carry high transaction costs, and concern
threats to a public good, all factors that may contribute to market fail-
ures.”255  Thus, mandates should be less troubling in the context of a
lawn ban than they would be if private individual behaviors were be-
ing directly targeted, and they may even be necessary to target and
alleviate the harms associated with lawns specifically, and climate
change more broadly.256
renovation, [which] do not directly operate on specific day-to-day behaviors” but recognizing
that they “indirectly constrain behavior” and thus categorizing them as “a direct regulation of
architecture that indirectly regulates individuals”); supra notes 228–33 and accompanying text.
251 A lawn ban would effectively bar individuals from maintaining a lawn, and would ex-
tend to actions like watering, mowing, and fertilizing.
252 See Kuh, supra note 9, at 1120.  Further, if a ban were limited to the front yard, the
behaviors that would be curtailed would be visible to the public.
253 See supra notes 222–27 and accompanying text.
254 See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 300
(2007) (“Environmental laws and regulation generally aim to force externality-producing
agents . . . to fully account for the consequences of their actions.”).
255 Carl J. Circo, Using Mandates and Incentives to Promote Sustainable Construction and
Green Building Projects in the Private Sector: A Call for More State Land Use Policy Initiatives,
112 PENN ST. L. REV. 731, 749 (2008).
256 See Kuh, supra note 9, at 1177 (describing a successful mandate as one that “do[es] not
impose disproportionate burdens on a select few, [that does] not unduly transgress the home,
[that is] designed to minimize inconvenience and other costs to the public, and [that is] effec-
tively ‘sold’ to the public through communication and demonstration of the measure’s benefits”).
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III. THE ANATOMY OF A LAWN BAN
This Article seeks to examine what a lawn ban might look like in
the event that such bans become more necessary and accepted.  Thus,
this Part addresses the appropriate scale of regulation and sources of
governmental power to enact a lawn ban, and discusses how it might
be implemented.
A. Regulatory Structure
1. Scope: State Versus Local
Because climate, resource scarcity, and environmental priorities
are so dependent upon location, a ban on lawns would not make sense
for all states or municipalities in the country.257  Certainly, a federal
ban on lawns would not be appropriate, at least not given the current
disparate U.S. climate and water usage patterns.  State regulation
might be useful in certain states that face similar water usage patterns
and demands across their jurisdictions.  Perhaps those states could es-
tablish standards that would trigger targeted incentives or disincen-
tives, and eventually, as water shortages became more acute, bans on
lawns.  However, local governments are likely more adept at address-
ing climate change in larger states with many different climates.258
Further, because the real power to effect change lies in the police
power, which is delegated to local governments,259 they are the ones
who are already taking action on lawns.260  A benefit of regulating at
the municipal level is that municipalities can be innovative and local
257 In many parts of the country, including the Northeast, lawns often grow with little need
for watering or fertilizer. See, e.g., Lawn Care Library, CORNELL U., http://www.gardening.cor
nell.edu/homegardening/scened6bfhtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2014) (noting that most lawns in
New York generally do not need watering other than for a few weeks during the summer).  Thus
many of the harms associated with lawns discussed earlier in this Article would not be present,
and therefore would not be alleviated, by a lawn ban.
258 For example, in California, a large state with many different climates, the state building
codes permit regional variation for climatic purposes, and many of the first green building codes
in that state were enabled under that exception to the standard rules. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
24, § 2-101 (2010).  When California passed its first state green code, it provided local govern-
ments with options to choose from depending upon their climate. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 24,
§ 101.7 (2010).  Similarly, California uses regional governments to implement its State Imple-
mentation Plan under the Clean Air Act. See Kenneth A. Manaster, Fairness in the Air: Califor-
nia’s Air Pollution Hearing Boards, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2006).
259 See infra notes 275–80 and accompanying text.
260 See, e.g., LAS VEGAS, NEV., CODE § 14.11.150(a) (Supp. 17, 2013) (prohibiting new turf
installation in residential front yards); see also Robert R.M. Verchick, Why the Global Environ-
ment Needs Local Government: Lessons from the Johannesburg Summit, 35 URB. LAW. 471,
472–73 (2003) (explaining that the level of involvement of localities in sustainable development
problem solving has increased dramatically in recent years).
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ordinances can be specifically tailored to the needs, concerns, and ge-
ographically related harms of each individual community.261  Thus,
pragmatically, local regulation seems to make the most sense.  How-
ever, there are also theoretical justifications for local action to allevi-
ate lawn harms.
Because a lawn ban is a controversial proposal, the political capi-
tal necessary to pass such an ordinance may be lacking in many (or
all) states.262  Localities, however, are different.  First, in many major
“thought-leader” cities in the United States, lawn norms are starting
to change.263  There already exists a market-driven desire in these
places for sustainable policies and efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.  Effective regulation at the local level can harness that mar-
ket desire, and when these cities adopt cutting-edge policies, others
tend to follow.264  Further, according to Charles Tiebout, different
communities provide different services and benefits—and adopt dif-
ferent policies—to attract different types of residents.265  So if lawn
bans are enacted at the local instead of the state level, those with a
preference for lawns can (theoretically) move to a jurisdiction without
a ban, thus allaying some concerns over property rights and free
choice that might otherwise be associated with lawn bans.
The Matching Principle provides some support for the idea that
certain local harms tied to climate change are ripe for local regula-
tion.266  Specifically, the Principle posits that the regulating jurisdiction
should not be larger than the regulated activity.267  At base, the costs
of lawns go beyond each individual municipality.  Water crosses juris-
261 Schindler, Following Industry’s LEED, supra note 235, at 289–90 (discussing the bene-
fits of ordinances that are crafted at the local level by local government actors).
262 This does not mean that there might not be valid reasons to consider a state-level ban at
some point—at least in certain states that have water shortage or pollution problems.  Such a
state-level approach might ensure uniformity so that rich and poor municipalities share an equal
burden, insulate local politicians from an unpopular decision, and be less subject to revision in
future years.
263 See Schindler, Of Backyard Chickens, supra note 60, at 234–37.
264 See Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 179, at 912 (describing norm bandwagons and
cascades).  See generally Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads,
Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992).
265 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
420 (1956) (describing residents as “consumer-voters” who look for municipalities that provide a
mix of public goods and services that appeal to them).
266 See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle:
The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 36
(1996) (arguing that “purely local externalities” should be dealt with locally); see also Schindler,
Following Industry’s LEED, supra note 235, at 295–96 (discussing the Matching Principle).
267 Butler & Macey, supra note 266, at 25.
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dictional boundaries; its availability and the harms that lawns impose
manifest themselves on a regional scale—the watershed for water use
impacts and runoff, and the grid-scale for energy issues.  While re-
gional or watershed-level governance might be ideal in this context,
the United States generally lacks strong regional structures.268  Thus,
the next smallest unit of government—local governments—would
most appropriately address these problems.269  For example, most
lawns exist in the suburbs, and greenhouse gas emissions in the sub-
urbs are usually higher than in central cities.270  This suggests that the
policies implemented in suburbs with respect to lawns might differ
from those implemented in cities.
Finally, the general-purpose local government should take action
instead of a special use district.  Although much concern about lawns
stems from a concern about water, municipalities cannot assume that
water providers will—or even have the authority to—act.271  And even
if they have the authority to ban water usage at certain times, the
water providers often prefer not to because bans are viewed as “less
customer friendly than incentives or education.”272
2. Power: Home Rule, Police Powers, and Zoning Enabling Acts
Although to some the idea of a local government banning lawns
might seem draconian, local governments in fact have many sources of
authority to enact lawn bans.  First, a land use ordinance generally
only requires a rational basis to be upheld.273  So long as the munici-
268 In the alternative, if sufficient organization and desire were present, lawn regulation
could occur through regional compacts.
269 Of course, within each watershed, local governments face a collective action problem, in
which the costs of water consumption are spread to other municipalities sharing the same
watershed.
270 See EDWARD L. GLAESER & MATTHEW KAHN, THE GREENNESS OF CITIES 7–9 (2008)
available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-pro
grams/centers/taubman/policybriefs/greencities_finalpdf (Rappaport Institute for Greater Bos-
ton and Taubman Center for State and Local Government Policy Brief).
271 See Hawes, supra note 147, at 11 (“Challenges arise where water providers are special
districts rather than municipal or county governments.  Without land use authority, these entities
have no control over the type of new development that may be approved and cannot dictate
plumbing codes or landscaping requirements.”).
272 Id. (noting that “usually only in extreme situations, such as drought or emergency, water
providers impose mandatory restrictions on water usage.  Throughout Colorado in the summer
of 2002, mandatory watering restrictions were the norm” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
273 See, e.g., City of Lilburn v. Sanchez, 491 S.E.2d 353, 355 (Ga. 1997) (“So long as an
ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasona-
bly necessary to achieve that purpose, without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the
ordinance must survive a due process challenge.”).
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pality had “fairly debatable” reasons for the enactment, the ordinance
will stand.274  This is due in part to broad police powers: local govern-
ments have the power to act in furtherance of the public health,
safety, welfare, and morals of the community.275  This power flows
from the state’s plenary regulatory authority,276 coupled with munici-
pal home rule authority, which now exists in most states.277  When a
land use ordinance is enacted pursuant to the locality’s police power,
it is presumed to be valid.278  Police powers are broad and may change
to encompass the times and the context.279  Thus, scholars recognize
that these powers justify “development regulations intended to con-
serve natural resources and protect the environment,” including regu-
lations that “broadly seek to curb unsustainable land development,
even when they impose significant burdens on the landowner.”280
An additional source of local power flows from enabling legisla-
tion, which exists in all states and expressly grants zoning powers to
municipalities.281  Because every state has adopted a zoning enabling
act, “the question of inherent power to zone is rarely litigated.”282
274 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (“If the validity of the
legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be
allowed to control.”).
275 See Anthony J. Samson, Comment, A Proposal to Implement Mandatory Training Re-
quirements for Home Rule Zoning Officials, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 879, 886 (“Absent expressed
or implied powers to regulate a particular activity, home rule municipalities may rely on their
police powers to safeguard and promote public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.”
(footnote omitted)).
276 See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (explaining that localities are
“created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as
may be entrusted to them”), overruled on other grounds by Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No.
15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
277 See supra note 33.  Home rule authority permits municipalities to regulate without first
needing express authorization from the state. See DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RIGOS & MELVIN
B. HILL, JR., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 14 (2001); see also James G.
Hodge, Jr., An Enhanced Approach to Distinguishing Public Health Practice and Human Sub-
jects Research, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 125, 130 (2005) (“Primary responsibility for protecting the
public’s health, however, is held by the states (and local governments via delegated state
authority).”).
278 Serkin, supra note 133, at 1257–58 n.174.
279 See Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 387 (“[W]hile the meaning of constitutional guaran-
ties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and
different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation.”); see also
Bos. & Me. R.R. Co. v. Cnty. Comm’rs of York, 10 A. 113, 114 (Me. 1887) (“[The police
power’s] exercise must become wider, more varied, and frequent, with the progress of society.”).
280 Circo, supra note 255, at 745.  The harms laid out in Part I.C supra suggest that the
support for a ban is at least debatable.
281 See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 127, at 29.
282 1 KENNETH H. YOUNG, ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.15 (4th ed. 1996).
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There is a question, however, whether the power to regulate lawns
would be considered within a locality’s zoning power, especially if one
is in a jurisdiction with a fairly specific zoning enabling act.  Many
states began the process of zoning by enacting the Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act (“SZEA”), which was promulgated in 1922,283
but many have now adopted their own modified, state-specific acts.284
Thus, the power to regulate lawns as a form of zoning would vary
based on the specific language of the state statute.  Historically, be-
cause most zoning laws did not mention yard vegetation, many com-
munities adopted “special purpose controls”—the aforementioned
weed ordinances—in addition to their normal zoning ordinances to
regulate landscaping.285  Some zoning enabling acts, however, do spe-
cifically address these issues.  For example, the Texas SZEA expressly
refers to the “size of yards” as zoning that is covered by the act.286
Thus, a locality seeking to ban lawns in Texas could likely rely upon its
express zoning powers, instead of falling back on its broader home
rule authority, to do so.287  On the other hand, if a locality is situated
in a Dillon’s Rule288 state whose SZEA does not specifically delegate
or mention the ability to ban or control lawns, the locality might not
be able to do so.289
283 See id. § 2.21; Alan R. Madry, Judging Ziervogel: The Twisted Path of Recent Zoning
Variance Decisions in Wisconsin, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 485, 492 (2007).
284 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.3101–.3702 (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, §§ 43-101 to -109 (West 2012).
285 Smith, supra note 11, at 217 n.51 (explaining that traditional zoning laws do not mention
vegetation but noting that whether the ordinance is within or outside of zoning is “purely seman-
tic” in that “there is no difference between living in a residential community that is ‘zoned’ to
prohibit bamboo vegetation than one that has a special purpose ‘no bamboo’ ordinance.”).
286 TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 211.003(a)(3) (West 2006).
287 Regardless of the approach taken, a local government should be certain that any ordi-
nance it adopts complies not only with the SZEA (or is pursuant to home rule authority), but
that it also complies with other state statutes that might limit the use of zoning or agriculture
ordinances or govern water consumption. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 3 (LexisNexis
2006) (zoning ordinances cannot prohibit use of land owned by religious groups for religious or
educational purposes).
288 In states that follow Dillon’s Rule, the powers of a local government generally include
only: powers granted to them expressly, powers “necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to”
powers granted expressly, and powers indispensable to a municipality’s purposes. See YOKLEY,
supra note 33, § 52; James S. Macdonald & Jacqueline R. Papez, Over 100 Years Without True
“Home Rule” in Idaho: Time for Change, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 587, 599 (2010).  Even in home rule
states, not all municipalities operate under home rule powers. See Briffault, supra note 33, at 10
n.20.
289 This concern may be academic, as zoning enabling acts regularly grant the power to
zone consistent with the police powers. See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 282, § 2.22 (describing the
SZEA as “delegat[ing] the zoning power in a single sentence . . . [which] begins by attaching the
power securely to the orthodox components of the police power”).
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A final municipal source of power to enact lawn bans could de-
rive from a determination that lawns are a nuisance, or a “public bad,”
due to their negative impact on the health and safety interests of the
public.290  To facilitate this legal construction, a municipality could
identify a “lawn” as a nuisance per se, for example by defining
“weeds” or “noxious vegetation” in a nuisance vegetation ordinance
to include lawns.291  By labeling lawns a nuisance per se, a local gov-
ernment could engage in a direct attack on the very existence of
lawns, as many have done against funeral homes292 or houses of ill-
repute293 in residential areas.  The ban would seek to directly prevent
the harm that lawns cause.294  For example, because turfgrass is often a
non-native species,295 a locality could address it in the same way it
addresses other exotic species.  Because non-native flora and fauna
have the ability to harmfully modify local ecosystems,296 local govern-
ments might take an aggressive position on removal and remediation
to alleviate the threat; indeed, local governments often regulate and
eradicate invasive species, and do so with the support of their police
powers.297
290 States and their authorized municipalities may proscribe nuisances pursuant to their
exercise of the police power. See, e.g., Nw. Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486, 491–92
(1916) (upholding a Des Moines ordinance declaring dense smoke emissions in populous areas
to be a nuisance).
291 See Serkin, supra note 133, at 1240 (“Applying the nuisance exception, the government
can regulate away a hazardous or injurious activity without paying compensation.”).  Of course,
such a determination could not be arbitrary, or it could be struck down as violative of substan-
tive due process. See infra note 329 and accompanying text.  A finding that lawns are a nuisance
would have a greater likelihood of success in an area facing water shortages or water pollution
problems.
292 See, e.g., Travis v. Moore, 377 So. 2d 609, 610–12 (Miss. 1979).
293 See, e.g., Martin v. State, 10 S.E.2d 254, 256 (Ga. Ct. App. 1940).
294 Lawn bans would both prevent harm and confer benefits because lawn removal would
result in environmental benefits to the broader community.  In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, the Court noted that the difference between the two is “often in the eye of the be-
holder.”  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992).  This distinction is important
to some courts, however, which
reason that harm prevention is a valid exercise of a state’s police power and that,
since all property is owned subject to the police power, no such harm prevention
can trigger a compensation requirement.  Fundamentally, the inquiry in these . . .
opinions is whether the regulation is an invalid exercise of the police power—that
is, whether it is irrational or arbitrary.
Serkin, supra note 133, at 1248 (footnote omitted).
295 See Lindsey, supra note 6.
296 See supra notes 124–32 and accompanying text.
297 See, e.g., PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLA., UNIFIED LAND DEV. CODE, art. 14, ch. D,
§§ 1–10 (Supp. 15, 2013), available at http://www.pbcgov.com/pzb/ePZB/uldcpdf (requiring own-
ers of property located near “natural areas” to remove invasive non-native species, and prohibit-
ing their planting); see also 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.12(1) (2012) (establishing “requirements
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The nuisance approach may be attractive to local governments
because of the deference that courts afford to governments that act to
protect their communities.  Of course, many landowners will probably
object to a ban on lawns, and are likely to assert that a newly enacted
land use ordinance works a regulatory taking of their property.  In
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,298 the Supreme Court held
that a state regulation depriving a landowner “of all economically
beneficial use” of her land is a taking, unless the use prohibited by the
regulation is already precluded by the principles of nuisance and prop-
erty law.299  On balance, a local government enacting a lawn ban has
support against such a constitutional challenge.  First, the idea of a
“regulatory taking” is a recent creation.  Previously, the Supreme
Court held that government regulations that control nuisances are not
subject to property protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment be-
cause the police power is broad enough to cover these situations.300
This is because “[u]nder the police power, rights of property are im-
paired not because they become useful or necessary to the public, or
because some public advantage can be gained by disregarding them,
but because their free exercise is believed to be detrimental to public
interests.”301  In addressing nuisances to protect the public, “the gov-
ernment can regulate away a hazardous or injurious activity without
paying compensation.”302
Even if a regulatory taking challenge were to proceed to the mer-
its, the claim would be examined under the per se test of Lucas only if
the landowner could show that the regulation deprives her of all eco-
for the licensing, possession, propagation, maintenance, and disposition of wild birds, mammals,
reptiles and amphibians”).
298 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
299 Id. at 1027–29.
300 See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 70 (1986) (“[T]he outer limit of the police
power has traditionally marked the line between noncompensable regulation and compensable
takings of property . . . . Legitimately exercised, the police power requires no compensation.”).
301 ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
§ 511 (1904).
302 Serkin, supra note 133, at 1240; see also Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928)
(finding that no taking existed in the order to destroy healthy cedar trees that harbored a disease
fatal to apple trees); Christine A. Klein, The New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss,
Sprawl, and Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155, 1195 (2007) (“In theory, traditional takings
law has long recognized a nuisance exception under which landowners are not entitled to com-
pensation when they are precluded from using their land to create a nuisance.”).  In Miller v.
Schoene, the Court held that the state was free to decide “upon the destruction of one class of
property in order to save another, which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to
the public.” Miller, 276 U.S. at 279.  Here, the government could similarly decide that protection
of water or other state resources is more valuable than an individual’s right to maintain a lawn.
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nomically viable use of her property.303  Because land uses that in-
volve a lawn are typically not dependent on the presence of the lawn
itself, a landowner would likely have a difficult time establishing that
being forced to remove a lawn was a deprivation of all use of the
property, especially because the doctrine of conceptual severance sug-
gests that a court must look at the parcel as a whole when considering
what has been taken.304  A lawn ban would result in the homeowner
losing the value of the lawn, but retaining the value of the rest of the
property.  Only in the rarest of cases would a lawn ban be assessed
under the Lucas jurisprudence.  Instead, a court would likely apply
the ad hoc analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City,305 which considers the regula-
tion’s economic impact, its interference with reasonable investment-
backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action.306
In practice, “landowners rarely win these cases,”307 and a court apply-
ing these factors to a lawn ban would likely find in favor of the munic-
ipality because the extent of the loss the lawn owner incurs is not
likely to be dramatic.308
The only remaining question is whether a court might consider a
retroactive lawn ban that includes an affirmative replacement require-
ment to be a permanent physical occupation of property constituting a
per se taking.309  Although there has been little scholarship addressing
the government’s authority to require people to take action on their
private property, the Supreme Court has recognized that a regulation
may force action without being deemed an impermissible taking.310  In
303 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.  Although there would be a defense if maintaining a lawn
would have been considered a nuisance at common law, that is unlikely.
304 See id. at 1016 n.7; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 331–32 (2002).
305 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
306 See id. at 123–24; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8 (applying the Penn Central analy-
sis); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
307 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 90 (1997). But
see E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528–29 (1998) (plurality opinion) (holding that extreme
retroactive liability that only applied to a small number of individuals who could not have pre-
dicted their liability could constitute a taking as applied to those individuals).
308 Here, the first two factors (economic impact and interference with reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations) would be fairly low because the lawn constitutes a small portion of
the entire economic value of most parcels of land. See ELIOT C. ROBERTS & BEVERLY C. ROB-
ERTS, LAWN INST., LAWN AND SPORTS TURF BENEFITS 5–6 (1989).  However, the character of the
action could resemble a physical taking. See infra notes 309–14 and accompanying text.
309 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982) (explain-
ing that a permanent physical occupation of property by a third party pursuant to government
authority is a taking).
310 Id. at 436, 441.
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Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,311 the Court ex-
plained that a physical occupation of land by a third party “is qualita-
tively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a
regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner.”312  Thus,
while there might be a taking if the government requires a landlord to
allow third parties to enter his land and install something thereupon,
there would not likely be a taking if the landlord were required to
install the thing himself.313  Accordingly, it would seem that, so long as
a lawn ban provides a homeowner with multiple replacement alterna-
tives, and allows the homeowner to install those alternatives himself,
the ban would not run afoul of Loretto.314
B. Crafting the Ban
Because lawns are not only ubiquitous in most American residen-
tial communities, but also legally permissible and often required, ban-
ning them would be what some commentators have referred to as a
“[r]egulatory transition[ ]”—a movement away from one legal regime
to another.315  These transitions “are inevitable over the long run, and
often represent socially adaptive responses to changed circumstances
or increased information.  They are difficult to achieve, however, be-
cause substantial psychological and political barriers stand in the
way.”316  Times of legal transition also bring about the risk of legal
challenges; whenever a local government considers adopting a new
land use ordinance—especially one that is controversial, uncommon,
or provocative—it must consider its likelihood of being sued.317  Mu-
nicipalities face a “problem of how to be fair to landowners who ac-
311 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
312 Id. at 436.
313 Id. at 436, 440 n.19.
314 After Loretto, a number of attorneys did attempt to “shoehorn” their clients’ cases into
the “permanent physical occupation” rule set forth by the Court, as the dissent in that case
feared. See id. at 451 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S.
245, 249–50 (1987); Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 59–60 (1st Cir. 1991).  The Court
clarified the Loretto holding in Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992), stating, “[t]he
government effects a physical taking only where it requires the landowner to submit to the physi-
cal occupation of his land.”  Id. at 527.  Landowners could try to use Yee to assert that a require-
ment by a local government that they replace their former lawns with something else is a
permanent physical occupation and thus a taking.  They could argue that the local government is
“compel[ling] a landowner over objection” to plant something on his property. See id. at 528.
315 Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 11, 45 (2003)
[hereinafter Doremus, Takings and Transitions].
316 Id. at 45.
317 See e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006–07 (1992); Loretto, 485 U.S.
at 421–24.
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quired property under one set of rules, only to see the uses of the
property drastically limited as morals, technology, or scientific under-
standing change.”318  Sometimes, the threat of a lawsuit is enough to
discourage a local government from enacting forward-thinking legisla-
tion.319  This Section addresses the different temporal circumstances
under which a lawn ban could be imposed, and the legal challenges
that might accompany or inform that timing decision.  It then consid-
ers who or what a ban could cover and control.
1. Timing of Ordinance Imposition
In considering when to impose a ban on lawns, a municipality has
three options.  The mandate: (1) could apply only to new construc-
tion—thus allowing the continuation of existing lawns but prohibiting
new ones; (2) it could apply only when the property at issue is sold,
rented, or modified in some way—requiring, prior to a conveyance of
the property, that any existing lawn be torn up and replaced with an-
other acceptable form of ground cover; or (3) it could be imposed
retroactively—requiring that all existing lawns be torn up, perhaps
pursuant to an amortization schedule.  This Section addresses the ar-
guments for, and legal consequences of, each option.
a. Applicable Prospectively
The most straightforward and least controversial approach to a
ban on lawns would be to prohibit any new construction (commercial,
residential, or both) from including a turfgrass lawn.  This is the ap-
proach taken in Las Vegas, which generally prohibits new turf installa-
tion in front yards and limits it in rear and side yards.320  Applying a
ban prospectively avoids some of the political concerns that accom-
pany retroactive ordinances that force existing community residents
and homeowners to take actions that they might not support or desire;
existing residents often prefer land use patterns to freeze once they
have moved in.321
318 ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 127, at 140.
319 See, e.g., Rob Scott, Threat of Lawsuit Halts Council Action on Fields Project, MOORES-
TOWN PATCH (May 22, 2012, 5:08 PM), http://moorestown.patch.com/groups/politics-and-elec
tions/p/threat-of-lawsuit-halts-council-action-on-fields-project.
320 LAS VEGAS, NEV., CODE § 11.14.150 (Supp. 17, 2013); see also id. § 11.14.140 (generally
prohibiting installation of new turf in nonresidential developments and in common areas of resi-
dential neighborhoods, but allowing installation of new turf on school grounds and in parks).
321 See William A. Fischel, Why Are There NIMBYs?, 77 LAND ECON. 144, 146–47 (2001)
(“[H]omeowners are touch[y] about changes in their neighborhood . . . . They want it left the
way they found it.”).
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There are some substantial problems with only applying a new
rule prospectively.  Specifically, because a ban on lawns would be put
in place to reduce harms, and hopefully alleviate some climate
change-related concerns, applying it only prospectively would curtail
its potential benefits.322  Especially in a community that is already sub-
stantially developed, it is unlikely that only banning new lawns would
have much of a cumulative impact.  In contrast, for a still-developing
area, beginning with a baseline of existing lawns and banning new
ones could still result in a substantial decrease in water and fertilizer
usage.
b. Applicable at a Point of Sale or Modification
A second approach that a municipality could take would be to
prospectively ban all new lawns, but also to require the removal of
existing lawns at the time that the owner of property covered by the
ordinance sells the property, rents to someone new, or seeks discre-
tionary permits to alter the property in a way that is related to the
lawn.  The imposition of ordinances at a point of change is a technique
already used in some situations.323  For example, under the Clean Air
Act, if a preexisting stationary source is “subsequently modified,” it
will then need to comply with new source performance standards.324
Similarly, some suggest that the only way that states will succeed in
achieving energy efficiency will be to require homeowners to take cer-
tain actions such as retrofitting their homes with energy efficient ap-
pliances and fixtures prior to a sale.325  Further, the highest court in
322 See Serkin, supra note 133, at 1265 (discussing problems with new rules that improve the
legal system, yet are only applied prospectively).
323 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that if structures are
“lawfully in existence or lawfully begun” before notice of a new zoning ordinance, the ordinance
shall not be applied to those structures, but must be applied to “any change or substantial exten-
sion of such use”); Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Rainwater Recapture: Development Regula-
tions Promoting Water Conservation, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 359, 365 (2010) (explaining
Prescott, Arizona’s imposition of mandatory water conservation measures on new construction
and the requirement that whenever “a homeowner in an existing home replaces fixtures in his or
her home, these replacements must comply with certain water conservation requirements” (cit-
ing PRESCOTT, ARIZ., CODE § 3-10-3 (2009))).
324 Serkin, supra note 133, at 1226.
325 SCHINDLER, ENCOURAGING PRIVATE INVESTMENT, supra note 182, at 20 (discussing
mandates and recognizing that “voluntary approaches to energy efficiency probably will not be
enough to reach the levels of deep cuts that are needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions”
(citing Telephone Interview with Blair Hamilton, Policy Dir., Vt. Energy Inv. Corp. (Oct. 18,
2010))); see also S.F., CAL., HOUSING CODE §§ 12A05–12A10 (Supp. 2013) (requiring water con-
servation inspector to analyze whether to require replacement of certain fixtures with low-flow
versions prior to a sale); Edna Sussman, Reshaping Municipal and County Laws to Foster Green
Building, Energy Efficiency, and Renewable Energy, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 21 (2008) (recog-
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the state of New York upheld the facial validity of a local ordinance
that banned mobile homes from certain areas of the Village of Valatie
upon a transfer of ownership of the land containing the mobile home
or the mobile home itself.326
Conditioning the point of ban implementation on change in own-
ership instead of applying it immediately is a form of amortization.  In
the context of land use law, some localities build in an amortization
period to newly adopted ordinances that would otherwise immedi-
ately force lawful, preexisting, nonconforming uses to come into com-
pliance with the new ordinance.327  The idea behind amortization is
that property owners should be given enough time to realize on their
investments before being forced to comply with the new law.328  Gen-
erally, an ordinance faces a greater risk of being deemed a taking or
violative of substantive due process if it is immediately applied to a
nonconforming use.329  Some jurisdictions, however, deem any amorti-
zation period to be per se unreasonable.330  Further, there is a real
question as to whether a lawn would be considered a lawful, preexist-
nizing that “garnering voluntary action is a slow process and municipalities may wish to consider
opportunities to mandate energy efficiency upgrades”).
326 Vill. of Valatie v. Smith, 632 N.E.2d 1264, 1265 (N.Y. 1994).
327 But see Margaret Collins, Methods of Determining Amortization Periods for Non-Con-
forming Uses, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 216 (2000) (suggesting that use of amortization
periods is not very common, as demonstrated by “[a] survey of 489 cities [which] showed that,
although planners in 159 cities had access to amortization programs, only 27 cities had actually
used them”).
328 See Murmur Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Dall., 718 S.W.2d 790, 798 (Tx. App. 1986);
see also Doremus, Evolution, supra note 95, at 1093–94 (“Law by its very nature favors stability
over time.  Legal rules are supposed to facilitate investment and allow people to make long-term
decisions with confidence.”).
329 See City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P.2d 34, 44–45 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Murmur
Corp., 718 S.W.2d at 798.  Generally, a court analyzing the legality of an ordinance that would
remove a nonconforming use would balance the harm that the ordinance imposes on the prop-
erty owner against the broader benefits to the public.  Serkin, supra note 133, at 1237.
330 See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity of Provisions for Amortization of Nonconform-
ing Uses, 8 A.L.R. 5th 391, 419–22 § 3[b] (1992) (listing cases holding amortization provisions to
be per se invalid); see also Serkin, supra note 133, at 1243 (noting that “[a] number of courts
have held that an amortization period is nothing but a deferred taking of property”).  Some
states’ SZEAs provide that zoning cannot be applied to existing uses.  Comment, Retroactive
Zoning Ordinances, 39 YALE L.J. 735, 735 n.6 (1930).  A statement in the SZEA limiting the
application of zoning laws to future uses, however, begs the question of whether lawn control
ordinances would constitute “zoning ordinances” for this purpose. Cf. PA Nw. Distribs., Inc. v.
Zoning Hearing Bd., 584 A.2d 1372, 1377 (Pa. 1991) (Nix, C.J., concurring) (“The weight of
authority supports the conclusion that a reasonable amortization provision would not be uncon-
stitutional. . . . [A] blanket rule against amortization provisions should be rejected because such
a rule has a debilitating effect on effective zoning, unnecessarily restricts a state’s police power,
and prevents the operation of a reasonable and flexible method of eliminating nonconforming
uses in the public interest.” (citation omitted)).
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ing, nonconforming “use” for purposes of this analysis, and thus sub-
ject to greater protections.331  This inquiry is relevant because
heightened protections are often afforded to existing uses of land.332
At least one commentator argues, however, that the additional protec-
tion of existing uses is unjustified.333  Thus, one could assert that lawn
bans applied at the time of a property change should not be viewed
differently and should not be more likely to result in a taking or due
process violation than those applied only prospectively.334
Assuming that amortization periods are permissible in a state,335
this approach—applying a ban at the time of a change in status of the
property—would be beneficial in communities that are already built-
out, in that it would cover more property than a purely prospective
ban.  There is, of course, an enforcement concern associated with this
approach; for example, homeowners might attempt to get around the
ban by failing to report new leases.  It is unlikely, however, that a
homeowner would forego the protections of a recording statute and
not record the sale or transfer of an interest in their property merely
to avoid having to remove a lawn.336  Further, because permit applica-
331 As discussed in Part III.A.2, supra, it is uncertain whether the zoning power could be
used to pass lawn bans because landscaping ordinances are often viewed as separate from zoning
ordinances.  “[M]odern zoning ordinances usually say nothing about vegetation, grass cutting,
and the like.  These matters are handled by special purpose ordinances.” Smith, supra note 11, at
206 n.9 (citation omitted).  Thus, one could argue that lawns are not a “use” of land; rather, they
are merely a type of landscaping that is situated on the land. But see FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 70.001(3)(b) (West 2004) (existing use is “an actual, present use or activity on the real prop-
erty” (emphasis added)).  Thus, in some jurisdictions, growing grass could be considered an ex-
isting use because it is an activity or a way that the property is being used.
332 Serkin, supra note 133, at 1244 (noting that courts could find that a “land use regula-
tion[ ] eliminating [an] existing use[ ]” is either a taking, or that it is unreasonable, and thus a
raises a due process problem).
333 See id. at 1242–43 (observing that courts assume that existing uses are protected by the
Takings or Due Process Clause of the Constitution, but do not explain specifically why or how,
and arguing that those clauses do not actually require that courts afford special protection to
existing uses).
334 See id. at 1230 (disputing the assumption that there is a difference between the unfair-
ness of regulating existing uses and that of regulating future uses).
335 See Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Reasonableness of Amortization Periods for Non-
conforming Uses—Balancing the Private Interest and the Public Welfare, 34 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 99, 109 (1988) (“[M]ost courts held that amortization provisions are valid if they
are reasonable in nature.  This is currently the majority view in America.” (footnote omitted));
see also PA Nw. Distribs., 584 A.2d at 1378 (Nix, C.J., concurring) (“A community should have a
right to change its character without being locked into pre-existing definitions of what is offen-
sive.”); Serkin, supra note 133, at 1244 (“The majority of courts, however, have upheld amortiza-
tion statutes—but only after applying a takings analysis.”).
336 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 35, at 646 (listing functions of the recording system
including preservation of important documents and protecting bona fide purchasers and credi-
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tions are matters of public record submitted directly to a municipality,
the municipality would be on notice of such changes, and thus able to
enforce the lawn ban.
There is also an efficiency concern with a ban applied at the time
of sale in that there might be an incentive for people to hold onto
their property.  If there is a close community in a given neighborhood,
there might be pressure from neighbors urging others not to sell or
rent because they want to maintain the existing uniform lawn
aesthetic.337
A final concern might tie back into the intrusion objection dis-
cussed earlier.338  Although a lawn ban would generally have only an
indirect impact on a homeowner’s behavior—because lawns are
banned, a person cannot continue actions that would maintain the
lawn—if that ban is imposed at the point of sale or permit-seeking,
one could argue that such a ban is actually directly regulating individ-
ual behavior because it would force a person to directly remove an
existing lawn.339  Therefore, intrusion objections might be less con-
cerning for future homeowners, but more pressing for those owning
the property at the time of sale.340
c. Applicable Retroactively
Finally, a municipality could adopt a retroactive lawn ban: a ban
imposed at the time the ordinance is adopted, which requires all cov-
ered property owners to tear up their existing lawns and replace them
with something else, or let them die.  At the time of this writing, there
does not appear to have been a legal challenge to any existing lawn
ban.  However, a municipality considering implementing a retroactive
ban pursuant to the discussion above might expect to be sued by land-
owners unhappy with the requirement that they remove their existing
lawns.  Indeed, some of these individuals might assert that they
bought their homes, in part, because of the specific landscaping that
fronts it, and that the ban interferes with their vested rights.  But pur-
tors against prior unrecorded interests); Corwin W. Johnson, Purpose and Scope of Recording
Statutes, 47 IOWA L. REV. 231, 231 (1962) (noting that recording acts serve “to provide a public
record of transactions affecting title to land”).
337 See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text.
338 Supra notes 228–35 and accompanying text.
339 See Kuh, supra note 9, at 1128–29 n.46 (“[R]egulations might be viewed as indirect with
respect to individuals who are prospective homeowners, renters, or residents—and who thus are
likely to experience the codes primarily in terms of how they have already defined existing archi-
tecture—but direct when they affect an existing property owner’s use or renovation.”).
340 Id.
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suant to the analysis in the previous Section, retroactive bans would
also likely withstand such challenges.341
That said, a retroactive approach is bold and would certainly be
viewed with disfavor by many.342  Scholars have described retroactive
laws as “anathema to liberty and a well-ordered society”343 and “a
monstrosity.”344  Others view them as unfair, believing that individuals
must be able to rely on existing laws in structuring their actions and
behaviors.345  Further, they are somewhat rare;346 for example, this au-
thor is unaware of any recent situation in which a city adopted a resi-
dential zoning ordinance and forced all lawful, preexisting,
nonnuisance commercial uses in the zone to immediately cease
operation.347
341 See supra notes 324–34 and accompanying text. But see supra note 330.
342 The SZEA seemed to expressly recognize that, at times, retroactive application of zon-
ing ordinances would be necessary and should be permitted, at least with respect to individual
cases:
While the almost universal practice is to make zoning ordinances nonretroactive, it
is recognized that there may arise local conditions of a peculiar character that make
it necessary and desirable to deal with some isolated case by means of a retroactive
provision affecting that case only.  For this reason it does not seem wise to debar
the local legislative body from dealing with such a situation.
ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING
ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS 2 (1926), available at
http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct1926pdf.
343 Serkin, supra note 133, at 1262.
344 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 53 (rev. ed. 1969).
345 See Doremus, Takings and Transitions, supra note 315, at 14 (“Changing the rules after
people have adjusted their conduct on the basis of those rules often seems unfair, because we
generally think that people are entitled to, and indeed should, govern their behavior according
to the existing rules.”); Smith, supra note 11, at 220 (noting that when the Baton Rouge Audu-
bon Society “acquired its property and commenced its natural landscaping, there was no weed
ordinance in effect.  Only after neighbors complained did the parish extend the ordinance to the
Audubon Society’s property.  Arguably, this sequence justifies protecting the Audubon Society
because they were proceeding lawfully, with no notice of any legal problem, when they acquired
and developed their property.”).
346 See J.S. Young, City Planning and Restrictions on the Use of Property, 9 MINN. L. REV.
593, 628 (1925) (“Retroactive zoning is not to be recommended except in very unusual cases
[where] public protection imperatively demands it.”).  Pasco County, Florida, however, at least
entertained an ordinance that would have “force[ed] some existing businesses to dig up their
parking lots to plant trees and bushes.”  James Thorner, Critics Snip Away at Landscape Ordi-
nance, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Jan. 20, 2002), http://www.sptimes.com/2002/01/20/Northof
tampa/Critics_snip_away_at_.shtml.  The ordinance as adopted only requires existing lots to be
relandscaped upon redevelopment of the property. See PASCO COUNTY, FLA., LAND DEV.
CODE § 905.2 (2012), available at http://www.pascocountyfl.net/index.aspx?nid=756.
347 It is likely that such action would infringe upon vested rights and constitute a taking.
See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 133, at 1224 (“A local government enacting a new zoning ordinance
must almost always grandfather existing uses. . . . Try even to imagine what it would mean for a
local government to force preexisting houses to conform to new setback requirements.”). But
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Despite its unpopularity, and thus political unlikelihood, there
are a number of benefits that would derive from a retroactive lawn
ban (assuming the lawns are replaced with environmentally friendly
alternatives).  Importantly, this approach would most immediately
and directly target the harms caused by lawns because it would en-
compass the greatest amount of property.348  In addition to the broad
societal and ecosystem services benefits that would flow from lawn
removal, removal would also lead to individual savings: lawnless
homes would use less water on average, and their proprietors might
gain free time that would otherwise be spent caring for the lawn.349
2. What Would Be Covered
A municipality considering a ban on lawns should think carefully
about how much lawn to ban.  Specifically, will all turfgrass be out-
lawed—that surrounding both residences and commercial proper-
ties—or just “front yards”?  If all turfgrass were banned, golf courses,
athletic fields, corporate campuses, and public parks would also be
impacted.  Such a broad ban would target and alleviate lawn harms
most thoroughly, assuming that all turf, regardless of location or use,
contributes to the same harms.  Such an extensive ban would intrude
on some commercial uses of the lawn itself, however, and thus could
raise additional considerations in a takings analysis.350  Further, if the
replacement material for turfgrass in play fields and parks did not al-
low for play, their utility might be decreased, leading to a decrease in
social capital in the neighborhood.351
see Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410–11 (1915) (suggesting that if a regulation prohibits
a common law nuisance, it is not a taking); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668–69 (1887) (hold-
ing that the police power allows for the removal of an existing use which the legislature deems to
be a nuisance).  Lawns are more akin to nuisances than are most commercial buildings in resi-
dential neighborhoods, and thus would likely fall under the nuisance doctrine of Mugler and
Hadacheck.
348 Cf. Serkin, supra note 133, at 1226 (“Grandfathering existing uses can dramatically limit
the effectiveness of new environmental regulations.”).
349 But see Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower:
Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV.
1481, 1534 (2006) (“Cognitive research also finds that individuals are reluctant to walk away
from sunk costs, irrationally ignoring the marginal costs and benefits of additional action.”);
Serkin, supra note 133, at 1270 (explaining that a “regulation eliminating an existing use wipes
out the money already expended in developing that use” but also recognizing an “unwarranted
prioritization of out-of-pocket costs over foregone profits”).
350 For example, if a commercial use is forced to cease, this raises concerns under a Penn
Central analysis, including the effects of the ban on landowners’ reasonable investment-backed
expectations and their primary uses of their property. See supra notes 305–08 and accompanying
text.
351 See supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text.
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Finally, a ban on all turf would cover not just publicly visible pri-
vate property in front of the house, but the backyard as well.  At base,
this should not raise additional legal concerns because the primary
justifications for bans pertain to water consumption and environmen-
tal harm rather than aesthetics.  A ban on backyard lawns might raise
additional privacy concerns, however, which could lead a court to ap-
ply heightened scrutiny to the ban.  The home itself, often surrounded
by a lawn, has received exceptional levels of protection under the
law.352  One reason for this heightened protection might be that ex-
pressed by Professor Radin, who views certain property—including
the home—as part of a person’s identity.353  Generally, people are an-
gered by laws when they see those laws as “infringing upon personal
autonomy . . . by preventing the home from providing a space for un-
fettered thinking, reflection, and the development of personhood.”354
Thus, the closer a regulation is to the self or its extensions, the greater
the level of resistance to it.355  Front yards are visible to all passing by
and thus lack a portion of the privacy, or the expectation of privacy,
associated with the home’s interior.356  The same cannot be said for
backyards, however.  Thus, courts might be more willing to protect
backyards for the same reasons they protect homes.  Further, the in-
trusion objections against a ban on backyards would likely be stronger
than if only front yards were banned.357
In contrast, a locality could decide only to ban front yards in resi-
dential areas or in front of commercial buildings or offices.  Such an
approach would raise fewer concerns with respect to issues surround-
ing privacy, intrusions, and takings, but it would also result in a
352 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (“[An] overriding respect for the
sanctity of the home . . . has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Repub-
lic.”); Kuh, supra note 9, at 1168–69 (“[T]he home has long been afforded special status in a
variety of legal contexts.”).  The Bankruptcy Code, for example, provides debtors with a home-
stead exemption, exempting their interest in the value of their home, up to a certain dollar
amount, from the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (2012).  The Fourth Amendment’s prohibi-
tion on unreasonable searches and seizures also recognizes the sanctity of, and provides special
protections for, the home. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
353 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 992 (1982)
(discussing the relationship between personhood and the sanctity of the home).
354 Kuh, supra note 9, at 1173 (footnote omitted).
355 See id. at 1160 (“[G]overnment restrictions on individual behaviors may arouse greater
resistance when they apply to behaviors that occur in or near the home or that must be enforced
in or near the home.”).
356 See id. at 1170 (“The home is considered ‘the most private of places,’ and laws that
would require ‘police invasion’ of the home for their enforcement are deemed particularly sus-
pect.” (footnotes omitted)).
357 See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text (discussing the “intrusion objection”).
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smaller total benefit.  Finally, a locality could simply ban “the indus-
trial lawn,” regardless of its location or use.358  Thus, any playfield or
green open space that, while perhaps non-native, did not need to be
watered, fertilized, or mowed, could remain.
C. Affirmative Lawn Removal and Replacement Requirements
One might wonder why a municipality would choose to ban lawns
rather than the practices that contribute to lawn-related harms: water-
ing, mowing, and fertilizing.  If these practices were banned, lawns
would surely die out in the regions where they are causing the greatest
harm, and most of the aforementioned takings concerns would be
avoided.  The problem is that if a locality only bans those behaviors, it
misses out on the opportunity and benefits that might come from a
ban that not only requires lawn removal, but also requires its replace-
ment with landscaping that is more beneficial.
Lawn bans that are part of a broader sustainability plan can fur-
ther ambitious community designs—the goal is not just to eliminate
environmental externalities associated with lawns, but also to change
the landscape into something more sustainable.  Further, if a locality
seeks to alleviate lawn-related harms, but does not control what can
be installed in their stead, the harms that the mandate seeks to elimi-
nate may not actually be avoided.  For example, if a locality forbids
lawn maintenance, but does not require lawn replacement, a home-
owner whose lawn died due to lack of water and fertilizer could sim-
ply install Astroturf, which may be less environmentally sound than a
lawn.  Thus, a lawn mandate that does not address subsequent re-
placement will not necessarily result in a net environmental benefit.
Although affirmative requirements do raise autonomy issues—
and along with them, concerns about constitutional challenges under
the First,359 Fifth,360 Fourteenth,361 and perhaps even Thirteenth
358 See Tekle, supra note 16, at 215 (defining the industrial lawn as one that “must be
treated with artificial fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides”).
359 One could argue that the lawn is a form of expressive speech that is “sufficiently imbued
with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.” See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam); see also City of Ladue
v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 48–49 (1994) (holding that city ordinance prohibiting all signs on residen-
tial property except a limited few violated constitutional protection of content-based speech);
JOHN J. COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS: LAW, AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 94
(1989) (“For many, architecture and other environmental features communicate ideas more ef-
fectively than does language . . . .”); Rappaport, supra note 8, at 907–08 n.129, 909 n.133 (arguing
“the case for natural landscaping as art” and noting that a Rhode Island statute defines art to
include “architectural landscaping” (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-75.2-3 (1992))); Smith, supra
note 11, at 221 (“If planting endemic grasses was necessary for the [Audubon] Society to express
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Amendments362—municipalities have historically regulated what indi-
viduals may plant on their property.  For example, statutes in colonial
Virginia prohibited people from overplanting tobacco and actually re-
quired them to grow other crops.363  Similarly, lawn maintenance is
not always a personal choice.  Weed ordinances, which require people
to mow their lawn and remove native plants,364 have been upheld de-
spite the fact that some view them as “irrational.”365
Similarly, many historic preservation ordinances require land-
owners to maintain the historic features of their property, or to install
its environmental ethic, then under First Amendment analysis the government cannot prohibit
that conduct unless it articulates a compelling, or at least an important, reason.” (footnote omit-
ted)).  Because the Supreme Court permits content-neutral regulations of lawn signs, perhaps
this indicates that lawns can themselves be regulated, even if lawns are viewed as expressive.
See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see also
Smith, supra note 11, at 223 (“Attaching First Amendment significance to certain landscape or
yard elements doesn’t necessarily mean that the government is precluded from restricting that
expressive behavior.  The effect of finding First Amendment protection is to remove the normal
presumption of legitimacy attached to the regulation.”).  Lawns might be expressive, but can still
be banned.  If cities can ban native plants—arguably merely for aesthetic preferences, with some
tangential nuisance arguments—certainly they can ban lawns, which are environmentally
harmful.
360 See supra notes 299–314 and accompanying text.
361 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 409.
362 Although it would be a stretch, a homeowner who is forced to remove her lawn and
replace it with a vegetable garden might argue that she is being forced to act in violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment.  Certainly, it takes time, money, and often expertise for people to suc-
cessfully grow vegetables.  However, local governments regularly mandate individual action. See
supra notes 239–49.  Further, weed ordinances arguably exist for purely aesthetic purposes, un-
like a mandate on productive landscaping, which has utility in that it can provide food in food-
insecure communities and foster social capital. See generally Schindler, Of Backyard Chickens,
supra note 60 (discussing the benefits of front yard gardens).  Moreover, the only reason that a
person would be required to engage in landscaping is because he or she owns or leases a house.
Thus, this argument would quite likely fail.
363 ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 127, at 135.
364 See, e.g., LITTLE ROCK, ARK., CODE § 20-2 (Supp. 62, 2013) (making it unlawful to
permit “[g]rass, weeds, or any other plant that is not cultivated, to grow to a height greater than
ten (10) inches”); see also Rappaport, supra note 8, at 891 n.81 (discussing a Natural Resources
professional’s decision to landscape with native plants: “After several months, a Notice of Viola-
tion arrived . . . from the County Solid Waste Department.  Her neighbor had filed a complaint.
If her yard wasn’t mowed in 20 days, the County would mow it” (citing Robin Hart, Natural
Landscapes vs. Mowing Ordinances, PALMETTO, Spring 1993, at 8–9)).
365 Rappaport, supra note 8, at 918 n.165 (referring to weed laws as “generally irrational
because enforcement of the prohibition does not further the articulated public safety and health
goals”); cf. City of St. Louis v. Galt, 77 S.W. 876, 880 (Mo. 1903) (holding that weeds can be
regulated under the police power because they are known to cause health problems).  One court
has struck down a weed ordinance, however, holding that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause.  City of New Berlin v. Hagar, No. 33582 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Apr. 21, 1976), reprinted in Rap-
paport, supra note 8, at 936–40 app.D.
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new ones, often at great expense.366  Although the affirmative require-
ment to install a certain type of landscaping might require the expen-
diture of money, that alone would not make it an unconstitutional
taking of property.367  There are political concerns associated with re-
quiring individuals to spend money, however, and because many mu-
nicipalities are facing severe budgetary shortages,368 it is unlikely that
they could contribute funding for lawn replacements.369  Thus, munici-
palities should think creatively about how to require replacement of
lawns with sustainable alternatives that would not cost their citizens a
great deal of money.370
Finally, because the removal of lawns might result in a decrease
in social capital or in spaces where children can play, a locality requir-
ing removal of lawns could commit to constructing additional public
parks in their communities.371  These could serve the role of third
places, and would be more inclusive than front yards, as they would be
truly public open space—a commons instead of private property.
366 For example, homeowners in Portland, Maine’s historic district who seek to replace gut-
ters that are “a significant and integral feature of the structure” may be required to use historic
but expensive materials, such as wood. See PORTLAND, ME., CODE §§ 14-634(a)(2)(a), 14-
650(b), (e), (f) (2013), available at http://www.portlandmainegov/citycodehtm.
367 See Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1067 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The fact that an
owner may incidentally be required to make out-of-pocket expenditures in order to remain in
compliance with an ordinance does not per se render that ordinance a taking.”).
368 See Bankrupt Cities, Municipalities List and Map, GOVERNING, http://wwwgoverning
.com/gov-data/municipal-cities-counties-bankruptcies-and-defaultshtml (last visited Feb. 15,
2014).
369 But see supra notes 198–201 and accompanying text (discussing ways for governments to
generate money for lawn replacement).
370 One possibility might be a co-op system.  For example, in Austin, Texas, a “non-profit
neighborhood farm network” called Urban Patchwork is pioneering an interesting approach to
urban gardening that combines features of community gardening with those of a Community
Supported Agriculture (“CSA”). See About, URB. PATCHWORK & NEIGHBORHOOD FARMS,
http://www.urbanpatchwork.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2014) [hereinafter URBAN PATCH-
WORK].  Under a standard CSA model, individuals buy “shares” in a farm or a group of farms,
and then receive a portion of the harvest during the growing season. Community Supported
Agriculture, LOC. HARVEST, http://www.localharvest.org/csa/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).  Under
Urban Patchwork’s model, residents and businesses can volunteer to be “hosts,” offering up
their yard space, and the organization will turn their yard into an urban farm. URB. PATCH-
WORK, supra.  In exchange, the homeowner gets a CSA share—some of the harvest from their
yard and from others in the neighborhood—for free. Id.  Although Urban Patchwork is a pri-
vate nonprofit, a city could create a similar municipal entity in conjunction with a lawn ban in
order to address potential criticisms about the time and money it would take for homeowners to
replace their lawns with gardens.
371 If the community were already built out, perhaps it could obtain vacant properties
through tax foreclosure or eminent domain for this purpose.
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CONCLUSION
Although lawns inflict numerous harms on the communities in
which they are located,372 most localities have not banned or even lim-
ited them.373  However, water shortage is quickly becoming one of the
most dire problems facing much of the country, as well as the world.374
Limiting lawns, especially in parts of the country where water
shortages or water pollution are most acute, is a direct way to reduce
their harms while simultaneously providing an opportunity to improve
food security and biodiversity.375  Although the hurdles to implement-
ing lawn bans are currently more political than legal, the changing cli-
mate might lead to changing attitudes.
Fifty years ago, if a city told a developer that her new homes had
to be “green buildings,” which incorporate certain features to make
them more sustainable and efficient than standard, more cheaply con-
structed homes, she would likely have been incredulous.  Today, how-
ever, green building ordinances are quite common in many
localities.376  In part, this legal change followed a shift in norms as
growing builder interest in green development was evidenced through
the use of voluntary market mechanisms like the Leadership in En-
ergy and Environmental Design (“LEED”) standards.377  In sum, this
Article suggests nothing more than an expansion of the notion that
local governments appropriately can regulate the sustainability of the
built environment; that principle simply needs to be taken beyond
buildings and into the yard.
Although the idea of a local government ordering its citizens to
tear up their lawns and replace them with vegetable gardens or xeris-
caping seems far-fetched, norms are already moving in that direction
in some communities.  Residents are petitioning local governments to
repeal outdated ordinances and to allow them to plant front yard gar-
372 See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
373 But see MORGAN HILL, CAL., CODE § 18.73.040 (Supp. 40, 2013) (requiring certain
projects to meet landscape water-efficiency goals by conforming to a water budget or plant-type
restriction; prohibiting total turf area from exceeding twenty-five percent of the landscape area;
and requiring eighty percent of plants in nonturf areas to be native or low-water use); S.F., CAL.,
ADMIN. CODE, ch. 63, §§ 5–6 (Supp. 33, 2010) (requiring applicants for public, residential, and
commercial landscapes greater than 1000 square feet to use low water or climate appropriate
plants, and restricting the turf areas of those projects to twenty-five percent of the total land-
scaped area).
374 See FISHMAN, supra note 94, at 9, 56.
375 Food security and biodiversity could be improved if individuals had to replace former
lawns with productive and native plants. See supra note 124.
376 See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
377 Schindler, Following Industry’s LEED, supra note 235, at 285.
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dens.378  Thus, as with green building, it is possible that as voluntary
actions become more common, and as droughts lengthen and water
and energy become more expensive, local politicians will become less
wary of the concept of a lawn ban.  And as far as trade-offs go, “[t]he
lawn is an easy sacrifice, compared to trees and shrubs—or taking a
shower.”379
378 See Wesson Supports Parkway Gardens, L.A. WAVE, Aug. 8, 2013, http://wavenews
papers.com/news/local/west_edition/article_dee68e4c-0061-11e3-b0f4-001a4bcf6878html; see also
Schindler, Of Backyard Chickens, supra note 60 (discussing petitions to get garden bans
overturned).
379 Smaus, supra note 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
